The Gettysburg Campaign (June 29, 1863)

With his army concentrated around Frederick, Maryland, Meade decided to thrust towards the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee’s army had reached as far east as Harrisburg, but the bulk of his army was concentrated around Chambersburg and Cashtown. If Meade was quick enough, he might be able to slide between Harrisburg and Chambersburg and split Lee’s army in two. A network of roads leading north would allow him to move more troops at a faster rate. These roads sliced through the Mason-Dixon line, and eventually terminated in a town called Gettysburg. From Gettysburg, another network of roads developed, this time leading west, northwest, north, northeast, and east. Lee was to the east and west of Gettysburg. Now was the time for Meade to make his move.

On June 29, 1863, Meade pushed his men further north. After a brief respite from the heat, the army was again subjected to miserable marching conditions as temperatures spiked to one-hundred degrees. The II Corps, many thought, were the lucky ones. It’s orders arrived late, and the II Corps hit the road around 8:00AM, four hours later than scheduled. Unfortunately for the men in the II Corps, it made up the lost time by marching 14 hours that day.

As the Army of The Potomac trudged north, Lee’s cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart, was creating a mess in central Maryland. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad was torn up, telegraph lines cut, and bridges were burned. Stuart had been out of contact with Lee for a number of days, and the Army of Northern Virginia was feeling its way through enemy territory with a sight line as far as the leading infantry column. Stuart was now “effectively ineffective”. Instead of probing for the enemy, Stuart was creating a name for himself in Maryland and Pennsylvania. His decisions in late June and early July of 1863 still ripple through history, and remain one of the many “what-if” scenarios of the Gettysburg campaign.

On June 30, Meade sent a message from his headquarters in Taneytown, Maryland, to Halleck in Washington, DC. Meade expected a major engagement with the Army of Northern Virginia at or near Gettysburg, and he wanted to notify Halleck and the rest of the war department. Buford, who commanded a division of cavalry, moved his brigades from Fairfield to Gettysburg. As he arrived, he encountered three regiments of Pettigrew’s Brigade. Pettigrew’s men were marching from Cashtown to Gettysburg on a reconnaissance, and soon turned back upon seeing Buford’s forces. Pettigrew reported his findings to General Hill and General Heth, but neither believed that a Federal force was nearby. Ignoring the information, Heth organized another reconnaissance towards Gettysburg scheduled for the morning of July 1st.

Scouts had been reporting to Lee that Meade was moving north, and he was moving fast. Lee realized that he needed to consolidate his army again. He called back his forces from York and Harrisburg, and issued orders to all Corps commanders to concentrate around Cashtown. Just like Meade, Lee recognized the importance of the network of roads leading to and through Gettysburg, and wanted to keep his army close to the town.

That evening, Buford camped just outside of Gettysburg, straddling the Chambersburg Pike. Aware of the Confederate presence, Buford threw out a picket line to the west and north west. They were positioned three miles away from the rest of Buford’s brigades, giving him ample warning and time to organize a defense if the Confederates intended to attack the next day.

Shortly before sunset, a thunderstorm blew in. Buford was worried that a fight would erupt in a few hours, and he would have no infantry support. Colonel Devin, a brigade commander serving in Buford’s Division, tried to reassure his commander by stating he would “take care of all that would attack his front during the ensuing twenty-four hours.”

Buford bristled at the comment.

“No you won’t. They will attack you in the morning and they will come ‘booming’ - skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold it we will do well.”