The Gettysburg Campaign (June 27, 1863)

By June 27, 1863, Hooker’s army had forded the Potomac River and regrouped around Frederick, Maryland. Lee had pushed his army well into Pennsylvania, and now occupied Chambersburg and Carlisle. Early’s Division was pushing eastward and closing in on York. Cashtown, Heidlersburg, Fayetteville, and even Gettysburg, had seen portions of the Confederate army march through their streets and demand supplies. In fact, on June 26, Confederate cavalry had clashed with the 26th Pennsylvania Militia just outside of Gettysburg. After a brief skirmish, the 26th ran from the field and left the door open for Confederate troops to filter through Gettysburg. Around 175 soldiers from the militia unit were taken prisoner during the fight. As the Confederates entered the town, a Gettysburg professor noted that the Confederates appeared to be like “so many savages from the wilds of the Rocky Mountains.”

Hooker had been angry with President Lincoln over the last few days. He believed that a significant portion of the garrison in Harpers Ferry should be folded into the Army of The Potomac. Lincoln disagreed. Harpers Ferry had been a key position since the war began, and both sides sought to control it. The Union garrison increased after Lee’s invasion of Maryland in September of 1862, in which Harpers Ferry was captured by Confederate troops. Hooker believed he needed these troops. Hooker was under the impression that Lee had an overwhelming force, just as McClellan thought during the Peninsula Campaign. Hooker repeatedly asked Lincoln for the troops from Harpers Ferry, and Lincoln denied him each time. Finally, on June 27, Hooker wrote to Lincoln, “I earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.”

The majority of the officers in the Army of The Potomac approved, but were left with the most important question following a change in command; “who’s going to lead us now?”

The obvious choice was Major General John F. Reynolds, commander of the I Corps, and the army’s left wing. Reynolds had been one of the officers pushing for Hooker to be replaced. On June 2, 1863, Reynolds met with President Lincoln for a private interview. During this meeting, it is believed that Lincoln asked Reynolds if he would consider being the next commander of the Army of The Potomac. Reynolds replied that he would only consider it if he were given free reign with the army, and cut loose from the political ties in Washington. Lincoln had to deny his request. Reynolds, one of the brightest commanders in the Union army, respectfully declined the offer to lead the Army of The Potomac.

At 3:00AM on June 28, Colonel James Hardee prepared to deliver a message from President Lincoln. George G. Meade had just fallen to sleep when his tent flap flew open. Startled by the Colonel, Meade initially thought that he was under arrest, as he was no stranger to army politics and knew how to stir up trouble. Hardee gave Meade the message, informing him that Hooker had been relieved of command and that Meade was to assume command of the entire army. Major General Meade, who had fallen asleep as the commander of the Union V Corps, woke up as the commander of the Army of The Potomac.

Meade assumed command at Prospect Hall in Frederick, Maryland. Meade knew two things; he knew that Lee was somewhere in Pennsylvania, and he knew the position of the Union’s V Corps. Beyond that, Meade was in the dark. The questions were almost overwhelming, but one stood out above all the rest; “Where is the rest of the army”. Corps commanders have a great deal of responsibility in the Civil War. Their decisions affect thousands of lives, and the men put their trust, for better or worse, in their Corps commander. The Corps commander’s field of vision extends over his men, and then slightly beyond to whoever is on his right or left. And even that information is vague, usually reserved to a quick message informing him on which Corps his flanks fall on. Obviously, more than this is put into the hands of a Corps commander, but in the course of the day for a Corps commander, the thought process and leadership breaks down to “Corps first, army second”. Meade, who only hours before had the mindset of a Corps commander, is now thrust into the highest position in the Army of The Potomac. Meade knows little about his own army, and virtually nothing about his opponent. To add to the stress, Meade knows that politicians in Washington will be breathing down his neck to destroy Lee’s army (the preferable route), cripple his army, or at the very least drive Lee back down to Virginia.

Meade immediately sought Hooker for information on Lee’s whereabouts. Satisfied with the information, and sensing the urgency of rapid movement, he quickly put the entire Army of The Potomac on roads that only lead to the northeast. What his subordinates did not know was that Meade was actually rushing the army to his preferred position along Pipe Creek, Maryland. New to command, Meade wanted to establish a defensive position in case of a Confederate attack. The position along Pipe Creek extended along a series of hills, and covered the main roads leading to Baltimore and Washington. If attacked, Meade would hold the initiative by commanding a formidable defensive position. Meade did not disclose the orders to his commanders, and did not notify them of the position until the evening of July 1. The Pipe Creek Circular, ironically, would be issued after contact was made in the fields and woods north and west of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.