With his army concentrated around Frederick, Maryland, Meade decided to thrust towards the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee’s army had reached as far east as Harrisburg, but the bulk of his army was concentrated around Chambersburg and Cashtown. If Meade was quick enough, he might be able to slide between Harrisburg and Chambersburg and split Lee’s army in two. A network of roads leading north would allow him to move more troops at a faster rate. These roads sliced through the Mason-Dixon line, and eventually terminated in a town called Gettysburg. From Gettysburg, another network of roads developed, this time leading west, northwest, north, northeast, and east. Lee was to the east and west of Gettysburg. Now was the time for Meade to make his move.
On June 29, 1863, Meade pushed his men further north. After a brief respite from the heat, the army was again subjected to miserable marching conditions as temperatures spiked to one-hundred degrees. The II Corps, many thought, were the lucky ones. It’s orders arrived late, and the II Corps hit the road around 8:00AM, four hours later than scheduled. Unfortunately for the men in the II Corps, it made up the lost time by marching 14 hours that day.
As the Army of The Potomac trudged north, Lee’s cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart, was creating a mess in central Maryland. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad was torn up, telegraph lines cut, and bridges were burned. Stuart had been out of contact with Lee for a number of days, and the Army of Northern Virginia was feeling its way through enemy territory with a sight line as far as the leading infantry column. Stuart was now “effectively ineffective”. Instead of probing for the enemy, Stuart was creating a name for himself in Maryland and Pennsylvania. His decisions in late June and early July of 1863 still ripple through history, and remain one of the many “what-if” scenarios of the Gettysburg campaign.
On June 30, Meade sent a message from his headquarters in Taneytown, Maryland, to Halleck in Washington, DC. Meade expected a major engagement with the Army of Northern Virginia at or near Gettysburg, and he wanted to notify Halleck and the rest of the war department. Buford, who commanded a division of cavalry, moved his brigades from Fairfield to Gettysburg. As he arrived, he encountered three regiments of Pettigrew’s Brigade. Pettigrew’s men were marching from Cashtown to Gettysburg on a reconnaissance, and soon turned back upon seeing Buford’s forces. Pettigrew reported his findings to General Hill and General Heth, but neither believed that a Federal force was nearby. Ignoring the information, Heth organized another reconnaissance towards Gettysburg scheduled for the morning of July 1st.
Scouts had been reporting to Lee that Meade was moving north, and he was moving fast. Lee realized that he needed to consolidate his army again. He called back his forces from York and Harrisburg, and issued orders to all Corps commanders to concentrate around Cashtown. Just like Meade, Lee recognized the importance of the network of roads leading to and through Gettysburg, and wanted to keep his army close to the town.
That evening, Buford camped just outside of Gettysburg, straddling the Chambersburg Pike. Aware of the Confederate presence, Buford threw out a picket line to the west and north west. They were positioned three miles away from the rest of Buford’s brigades, giving him ample warning and time to organize a defense if the Confederates intended to attack the next day.
Shortly before sunset, a thunderstorm blew in. Buford was worried that a fight would erupt in a few hours, and he would have no infantry support. Colonel Devin, a brigade commander serving in Buford’s Division, tried to reassure his commander by stating he would “take care of all that would attack his front during the ensuing twenty-four hours.”
Buford bristled at the comment.
“No you won’t. They will attack you in the morning and they will come ‘booming’ - skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold it we will do well.”
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
Monday, June 27, 2011
The Gettysburg Campaign (June 27, 1863)
By June 27, 1863, Hooker’s army had forded the Potomac River and regrouped around Frederick, Maryland. Lee had pushed his army well into Pennsylvania, and now occupied Chambersburg and Carlisle. Early’s Division was pushing eastward and closing in on York. Cashtown, Heidlersburg, Fayetteville, and even Gettysburg, had seen portions of the Confederate army march through their streets and demand supplies. In fact, on June 26, Confederate cavalry had clashed with the 26th Pennsylvania Militia just outside of Gettysburg. After a brief skirmish, the 26th ran from the field and left the door open for Confederate troops to filter through Gettysburg. Around 175 soldiers from the militia unit were taken prisoner during the fight. As the Confederates entered the town, a Gettysburg professor noted that the Confederates appeared to be like “so many savages from the wilds of the Rocky Mountains.”
Hooker had been angry with President Lincoln over the last few days. He believed that a significant portion of the garrison in Harpers Ferry should be folded into the Army of The Potomac. Lincoln disagreed. Harpers Ferry had been a key position since the war began, and both sides sought to control it. The Union garrison increased after Lee’s invasion of Maryland in September of 1862, in which Harpers Ferry was captured by Confederate troops. Hooker believed he needed these troops. Hooker was under the impression that Lee had an overwhelming force, just as McClellan thought during the Peninsula Campaign. Hooker repeatedly asked Lincoln for the troops from Harpers Ferry, and Lincoln denied him each time. Finally, on June 27, Hooker wrote to Lincoln, “I earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.”
The majority of the officers in the Army of The Potomac approved, but were left with the most important question following a change in command; “who’s going to lead us now?”
The obvious choice was Major General John F. Reynolds, commander of the I Corps, and the army’s left wing. Reynolds had been one of the officers pushing for Hooker to be replaced. On June 2, 1863, Reynolds met with President Lincoln for a private interview. During this meeting, it is believed that Lincoln asked Reynolds if he would consider being the next commander of the Army of The Potomac. Reynolds replied that he would only consider it if he were given free reign with the army, and cut loose from the political ties in Washington. Lincoln had to deny his request. Reynolds, one of the brightest commanders in the Union army, respectfully declined the offer to lead the Army of The Potomac.
At 3:00AM on June 28, Colonel James Hardee prepared to deliver a message from President Lincoln. George G. Meade had just fallen to sleep when his tent flap flew open. Startled by the Colonel, Meade initially thought that he was under arrest, as he was no stranger to army politics and knew how to stir up trouble. Hardee gave Meade the message, informing him that Hooker had been relieved of command and that Meade was to assume command of the entire army. Major General Meade, who had fallen asleep as the commander of the Union V Corps, woke up as the commander of the Army of The Potomac.
Meade assumed command at Prospect Hall in Frederick, Maryland. Meade knew two things; he knew that Lee was somewhere in Pennsylvania, and he knew the position of the Union’s V Corps. Beyond that, Meade was in the dark. The questions were almost overwhelming, but one stood out above all the rest; “Where is the rest of the army”. Corps commanders have a great deal of responsibility in the Civil War. Their decisions affect thousands of lives, and the men put their trust, for better or worse, in their Corps commander. The Corps commander’s field of vision extends over his men, and then slightly beyond to whoever is on his right or left. And even that information is vague, usually reserved to a quick message informing him on which Corps his flanks fall on. Obviously, more than this is put into the hands of a Corps commander, but in the course of the day for a Corps commander, the thought process and leadership breaks down to “Corps first, army second”. Meade, who only hours before had the mindset of a Corps commander, is now thrust into the highest position in the Army of The Potomac. Meade knows little about his own army, and virtually nothing about his opponent. To add to the stress, Meade knows that politicians in Washington will be breathing down his neck to destroy Lee’s army (the preferable route), cripple his army, or at the very least drive Lee back down to Virginia.
Meade immediately sought Hooker for information on Lee’s whereabouts. Satisfied with the information, and sensing the urgency of rapid movement, he quickly put the entire Army of The Potomac on roads that only lead to the northeast. What his subordinates did not know was that Meade was actually rushing the army to his preferred position along Pipe Creek, Maryland. New to command, Meade wanted to establish a defensive position in case of a Confederate attack. The position along Pipe Creek extended along a series of hills, and covered the main roads leading to Baltimore and Washington. If attacked, Meade would hold the initiative by commanding a formidable defensive position. Meade did not disclose the orders to his commanders, and did not notify them of the position until the evening of July 1. The Pipe Creek Circular, ironically, would be issued after contact was made in the fields and woods north and west of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Hooker had been angry with President Lincoln over the last few days. He believed that a significant portion of the garrison in Harpers Ferry should be folded into the Army of The Potomac. Lincoln disagreed. Harpers Ferry had been a key position since the war began, and both sides sought to control it. The Union garrison increased after Lee’s invasion of Maryland in September of 1862, in which Harpers Ferry was captured by Confederate troops. Hooker believed he needed these troops. Hooker was under the impression that Lee had an overwhelming force, just as McClellan thought during the Peninsula Campaign. Hooker repeatedly asked Lincoln for the troops from Harpers Ferry, and Lincoln denied him each time. Finally, on June 27, Hooker wrote to Lincoln, “I earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.”
The majority of the officers in the Army of The Potomac approved, but were left with the most important question following a change in command; “who’s going to lead us now?”
The obvious choice was Major General John F. Reynolds, commander of the I Corps, and the army’s left wing. Reynolds had been one of the officers pushing for Hooker to be replaced. On June 2, 1863, Reynolds met with President Lincoln for a private interview. During this meeting, it is believed that Lincoln asked Reynolds if he would consider being the next commander of the Army of The Potomac. Reynolds replied that he would only consider it if he were given free reign with the army, and cut loose from the political ties in Washington. Lincoln had to deny his request. Reynolds, one of the brightest commanders in the Union army, respectfully declined the offer to lead the Army of The Potomac.
At 3:00AM on June 28, Colonel James Hardee prepared to deliver a message from President Lincoln. George G. Meade had just fallen to sleep when his tent flap flew open. Startled by the Colonel, Meade initially thought that he was under arrest, as he was no stranger to army politics and knew how to stir up trouble. Hardee gave Meade the message, informing him that Hooker had been relieved of command and that Meade was to assume command of the entire army. Major General Meade, who had fallen asleep as the commander of the Union V Corps, woke up as the commander of the Army of The Potomac.
Meade assumed command at Prospect Hall in Frederick, Maryland. Meade knew two things; he knew that Lee was somewhere in Pennsylvania, and he knew the position of the Union’s V Corps. Beyond that, Meade was in the dark. The questions were almost overwhelming, but one stood out above all the rest; “Where is the rest of the army”. Corps commanders have a great deal of responsibility in the Civil War. Their decisions affect thousands of lives, and the men put their trust, for better or worse, in their Corps commander. The Corps commander’s field of vision extends over his men, and then slightly beyond to whoever is on his right or left. And even that information is vague, usually reserved to a quick message informing him on which Corps his flanks fall on. Obviously, more than this is put into the hands of a Corps commander, but in the course of the day for a Corps commander, the thought process and leadership breaks down to “Corps first, army second”. Meade, who only hours before had the mindset of a Corps commander, is now thrust into the highest position in the Army of The Potomac. Meade knows little about his own army, and virtually nothing about his opponent. To add to the stress, Meade knows that politicians in Washington will be breathing down his neck to destroy Lee’s army (the preferable route), cripple his army, or at the very least drive Lee back down to Virginia.
Meade immediately sought Hooker for information on Lee’s whereabouts. Satisfied with the information, and sensing the urgency of rapid movement, he quickly put the entire Army of The Potomac on roads that only lead to the northeast. What his subordinates did not know was that Meade was actually rushing the army to his preferred position along Pipe Creek, Maryland. New to command, Meade wanted to establish a defensive position in case of a Confederate attack. The position along Pipe Creek extended along a series of hills, and covered the main roads leading to Baltimore and Washington. If attacked, Meade would hold the initiative by commanding a formidable defensive position. Meade did not disclose the orders to his commanders, and did not notify them of the position until the evening of July 1. The Pipe Creek Circular, ironically, would be issued after contact was made in the fields and woods north and west of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Thursday, June 23, 2011
The Gettysburg Campaign (June 23, 1863)
June 23, 1863 was a day of rest for the entire Federal army, which was well received amongst the men. The men were exhausted, dehydrated, and physically worn down. Over the course of two-and-a-half weeks, the majority of Hooker’s army had marched around 400 miles, with some elements marching as high as 440 miles.
Blisters were the most common ailment for soldiers at this point, but some soldiers exhibited extreme cases of physical injury. For some, the skin on their feet simply peeled away, exposing the raw and extremely sensitive tissue. The feet and ankles would swell to twice their original size. Soldiers who started the day with a decent sized shoe would be cutting the leather away about 12-15 hours later because they could not remove their feet. Exhausted legs would give out on the march, and men would stumble and fall in the middle of a congested road.
Officers and NCO’s attempted to maintain order in the ranks. This was largely ignored, and eventually became so prevalent throughout the entire army that it was hardly enforced. The ranks disintegrated, and the men on the march loosely resembled a giant mob. Tired soldiers who felt they couldn’t continue trudged their way to the side of the road, laid down, and fell asleep. Home also called the soldiers’ names, especially for those who lived or had families in Maryland or Pennsylvania. What started as a trip to a tree line to “visit the sink”, might turn into a soldier running as far as his legs would carry him. As the conditions of the march deteriorated, the desertion rate climbed. Some regiments were losing as many as 20-30 men per day.
The stifling dust was torturous for the soldiers. A fine powder would hang in the air, accumulating on anything it came in contact with. The obvious surfaces would be the jackets, shirts, and trousers. This constricted the garments, taking away the ability for the fabric to “breathe”. Dust would irritate the eyes, fill the nostrils and ears, and cake in dry mouths. A constant cough developed for many soldiers, due to inhaling the floating grime. Unfortunately, for some, the air was as deadly as a battlefield. Irritated tissue in the throat and lungs would swell, constricting airways and turning a task as easy as breathing into a conscious effort to stay alive. The threat of suffocation was very real during the march north. To combat the dust, soldiers would frequently tie damp handkerchiefs around their nose and mouth to help filter the dust out of the air they were breathing.
The lack of clean water took its toll on the soldiers digestive system. Thousands of soldiers marching by a spring or creek would create a traffic jam. For the impatient soldier, a muddy puddle looked just as refreshing as a clear, bubbly spring. Dysentery sliced its way through a soldier, dehydrating the individual even further. For the soldier who was already dehydrated, dysentery was almost a death sentence. The ability to retain fluids was lost, due to vomiting and diarrhea. The body would grow weak, the mind delusional, and within a few days, death would follow.
Blistered feet, tired limbs, desertion, and dust inhalation are all manageable. One element that is beyond an individuals control is the heat and humidity. During the march, temperatures frequently soared to around 100 degrees, with the humidity around the same number. Body temperatures would rise, and the mind of the soldier would scream “Cool me down”. As a result, jackets were tossed to the side of the roads, along with knapsacks, blankets, haversacks, and even muskets. Some could tolerate the heat better than others, and they took advantage of it. For those able to combat the heat, the roads north turned into a massive bounty of personal effects. Money, playing cards, dice, pictures, food, hygiene materials, tobacco, writing paper, and other personal items were immediately available on a first-come-first-serve basis. Soldiers would frequently fall out to the side of the road to rifle through equipment, hoping to find items to keep, sell or trade.
Those who couldn’t deal with the heat ended up with heat stroke or heat exhaustion. Men would pass out mid-march, or hold conversations with friends who had died earlier in the war. Soldiers would babble in a language that never existed, convinced that what they were saying was comprehensible. In the worst cases, the body would overheat and shut down. Brain damage would soon ensue, and perhaps even death.
These conditions were not limited to the Union army. Lee’s army was experiencing the same hardships faced by Hooker’s army. The only advantage the Army of Northern Virginia had was that it knew its objective. The Army of The Potomac was playing a guessing game, and often found themselves marching in circles or retracing their steps from a few days before. The Confederates knew about how long and how far they would be going, giving the soldier a better mindset on what to expect. The Federals could only tag along, and hope their men could withstand the physical and mental limits that were being contested on a daily basis.
Blisters were the most common ailment for soldiers at this point, but some soldiers exhibited extreme cases of physical injury. For some, the skin on their feet simply peeled away, exposing the raw and extremely sensitive tissue. The feet and ankles would swell to twice their original size. Soldiers who started the day with a decent sized shoe would be cutting the leather away about 12-15 hours later because they could not remove their feet. Exhausted legs would give out on the march, and men would stumble and fall in the middle of a congested road.
Officers and NCO’s attempted to maintain order in the ranks. This was largely ignored, and eventually became so prevalent throughout the entire army that it was hardly enforced. The ranks disintegrated, and the men on the march loosely resembled a giant mob. Tired soldiers who felt they couldn’t continue trudged their way to the side of the road, laid down, and fell asleep. Home also called the soldiers’ names, especially for those who lived or had families in Maryland or Pennsylvania. What started as a trip to a tree line to “visit the sink”, might turn into a soldier running as far as his legs would carry him. As the conditions of the march deteriorated, the desertion rate climbed. Some regiments were losing as many as 20-30 men per day.
The stifling dust was torturous for the soldiers. A fine powder would hang in the air, accumulating on anything it came in contact with. The obvious surfaces would be the jackets, shirts, and trousers. This constricted the garments, taking away the ability for the fabric to “breathe”. Dust would irritate the eyes, fill the nostrils and ears, and cake in dry mouths. A constant cough developed for many soldiers, due to inhaling the floating grime. Unfortunately, for some, the air was as deadly as a battlefield. Irritated tissue in the throat and lungs would swell, constricting airways and turning a task as easy as breathing into a conscious effort to stay alive. The threat of suffocation was very real during the march north. To combat the dust, soldiers would frequently tie damp handkerchiefs around their nose and mouth to help filter the dust out of the air they were breathing.
The lack of clean water took its toll on the soldiers digestive system. Thousands of soldiers marching by a spring or creek would create a traffic jam. For the impatient soldier, a muddy puddle looked just as refreshing as a clear, bubbly spring. Dysentery sliced its way through a soldier, dehydrating the individual even further. For the soldier who was already dehydrated, dysentery was almost a death sentence. The ability to retain fluids was lost, due to vomiting and diarrhea. The body would grow weak, the mind delusional, and within a few days, death would follow.
Blistered feet, tired limbs, desertion, and dust inhalation are all manageable. One element that is beyond an individuals control is the heat and humidity. During the march, temperatures frequently soared to around 100 degrees, with the humidity around the same number. Body temperatures would rise, and the mind of the soldier would scream “Cool me down”. As a result, jackets were tossed to the side of the roads, along with knapsacks, blankets, haversacks, and even muskets. Some could tolerate the heat better than others, and they took advantage of it. For those able to combat the heat, the roads north turned into a massive bounty of personal effects. Money, playing cards, dice, pictures, food, hygiene materials, tobacco, writing paper, and other personal items were immediately available on a first-come-first-serve basis. Soldiers would frequently fall out to the side of the road to rifle through equipment, hoping to find items to keep, sell or trade.
Those who couldn’t deal with the heat ended up with heat stroke or heat exhaustion. Men would pass out mid-march, or hold conversations with friends who had died earlier in the war. Soldiers would babble in a language that never existed, convinced that what they were saying was comprehensible. In the worst cases, the body would overheat and shut down. Brain damage would soon ensue, and perhaps even death.
These conditions were not limited to the Union army. Lee’s army was experiencing the same hardships faced by Hooker’s army. The only advantage the Army of Northern Virginia had was that it knew its objective. The Army of The Potomac was playing a guessing game, and often found themselves marching in circles or retracing their steps from a few days before. The Confederates knew about how long and how far they would be going, giving the soldier a better mindset on what to expect. The Federals could only tag along, and hope their men could withstand the physical and mental limits that were being contested on a daily basis.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
The Gettysburg Campaign (June 16 - 21, 1863)
Only the II and VI Corps were mobile on June 16, 1863 for the Army of The Potomac. The I and XI Corps occupied Centreville, Virginia. The III Corps set up camp near the old Bull Run/Manassas battlefield. The V Corps rested near Manassas Junction. The II and VI Corps eventually passed through Wolf Run Shoals, where the men bathed, refilled canteens, and soothed their extremely blistered feet.
While the majority of Hooker’s army rested, Lee’s army continued pushing northward. The bulk of Ewell’s Corps had reached the Potomac River, with Rodes’ Division already on Maryland’s turf. Longstreet’s Corps soon found itself marching over unfavorable ground, making the next few days miserable for the infantry. Rather than pass through one of the gaps and filter into the Shenandoah Valley, Longstreet’s Corps continued its march north just east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The hilly terrain, combined with the high heat and humidity, created conditions much like the soldiers of the Army of The Potomac were facing 20-30 miles to the east. A soldier in Longstreet’s Corp wrote, “The dust is almost suffocating. It forms a fine impalpable powder, sufficiently light to fill the air like smoke, and penetrate the eyes, ears, nostrils, hair, and skin, until its power of annoyance is unbearable. Then, when one’s clothing is utterly saturated with perspiration mixing with the dust in a grimy paste; and above all weighs the heavy musket…and the chafing canteen straps, is it strange that one sees hundreds of men gasping for breath, and lolling out their tongues like mad men?”
Hill’s Corps was the most spread out; Pender’s Division camped a few miles west of Fredericksburg, Virginia, while Anderson’s and Heth’s Division camped in and around Culpeper Court House in Pennsylvania. Jenkin’s cavalry continued to occupy Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, combing the town and surrounding farmland’s for food and supplies. Meanwhile, panic descended upon Pennsylvania’s capital city of Harrisburg. Citizens began burying valuables, withdrawing significant amounts of money, and fleeing to other cities to the east and north.
June 17, 1863 found Hooker’s entire army moving north along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. General Samuel Crawford’s Pennsylvania Reserve Division joined the Union V Corps after spending the last few months guarding the forts in and around Washington, DC.
Lee’s army also continued moving northward. Both sides now settled into a regular pattern; a Corps marching 20-25 miles per day with little-to-no rest. The only “break” in the monotony of marching was around the town of Aldie and Aldie’s Gap, where Union and Confederate cavalry clashed on June 17. It should have been an overwhelming Union victory, as the Union troopers outnumbered the Confederate’s nearly 2 to 1. Instead of using its combined strength, Union troopers were fed into the fight piecemeal. At the end of the day, the battle resulted in a bloody stalemate.
On June 18, 1863, only the Union XI Corps made a significant march. After a 20 mile march, the Corps took up positions in and around Leesburg, Virginia, guarding the fords along the Potomac River. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a militia brigade composed of 2 New York regiments arrived, bringing a sense of relief to the remaining citizens. This newly-formed militia was known as the Department of The Susquehanna, and was hastily thrown together due to the invasion by the Confederacy. It’s commander was Brigadier General Joseph Knipe.
On the Confederate side, Johnson’s Division crossed the Potomac River and entered Maryland. After fording the Potomac, Marylanders in George Steuart’s Brigade stooped over and kissed the ground of their home state.
While the majority of the soldiers despised the long marches, a few were able to see through the pain and misery and notice their surroundings. Charles Lippitt, a surgeon in Pickett’s Division wrote, “I was never more struck with the grandeur of mountain scenery than on this march. No other scenery can equal it.”
Also on June 18, Colonel John Mosby captured a Federal courier. The courier was carrying dispatches with the positions of the entire Union army from June 17, as well as the orders for the next day. This information was then sent to General Lee.
Between June 19-21, 1863, the Union and Confederate armies would concentrate near the Potomac River. The 2 armies, which had been fairly spread out up to this point, now had elements within 6 miles of each other. The next week and a half will contain a whirlwind of events for both armies; a major change in command for the Union, questionable decision making by Southern commanders, and a 3-day battle that will make-or-break the hopes of the Confederate States of America.
While the majority of Hooker’s army rested, Lee’s army continued pushing northward. The bulk of Ewell’s Corps had reached the Potomac River, with Rodes’ Division already on Maryland’s turf. Longstreet’s Corps soon found itself marching over unfavorable ground, making the next few days miserable for the infantry. Rather than pass through one of the gaps and filter into the Shenandoah Valley, Longstreet’s Corps continued its march north just east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The hilly terrain, combined with the high heat and humidity, created conditions much like the soldiers of the Army of The Potomac were facing 20-30 miles to the east. A soldier in Longstreet’s Corp wrote, “The dust is almost suffocating. It forms a fine impalpable powder, sufficiently light to fill the air like smoke, and penetrate the eyes, ears, nostrils, hair, and skin, until its power of annoyance is unbearable. Then, when one’s clothing is utterly saturated with perspiration mixing with the dust in a grimy paste; and above all weighs the heavy musket…and the chafing canteen straps, is it strange that one sees hundreds of men gasping for breath, and lolling out their tongues like mad men?”
Hill’s Corps was the most spread out; Pender’s Division camped a few miles west of Fredericksburg, Virginia, while Anderson’s and Heth’s Division camped in and around Culpeper Court House in Pennsylvania. Jenkin’s cavalry continued to occupy Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, combing the town and surrounding farmland’s for food and supplies. Meanwhile, panic descended upon Pennsylvania’s capital city of Harrisburg. Citizens began burying valuables, withdrawing significant amounts of money, and fleeing to other cities to the east and north.
June 17, 1863 found Hooker’s entire army moving north along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. General Samuel Crawford’s Pennsylvania Reserve Division joined the Union V Corps after spending the last few months guarding the forts in and around Washington, DC.
Lee’s army also continued moving northward. Both sides now settled into a regular pattern; a Corps marching 20-25 miles per day with little-to-no rest. The only “break” in the monotony of marching was around the town of Aldie and Aldie’s Gap, where Union and Confederate cavalry clashed on June 17. It should have been an overwhelming Union victory, as the Union troopers outnumbered the Confederate’s nearly 2 to 1. Instead of using its combined strength, Union troopers were fed into the fight piecemeal. At the end of the day, the battle resulted in a bloody stalemate.
On June 18, 1863, only the Union XI Corps made a significant march. After a 20 mile march, the Corps took up positions in and around Leesburg, Virginia, guarding the fords along the Potomac River. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a militia brigade composed of 2 New York regiments arrived, bringing a sense of relief to the remaining citizens. This newly-formed militia was known as the Department of The Susquehanna, and was hastily thrown together due to the invasion by the Confederacy. It’s commander was Brigadier General Joseph Knipe.
On the Confederate side, Johnson’s Division crossed the Potomac River and entered Maryland. After fording the Potomac, Marylanders in George Steuart’s Brigade stooped over and kissed the ground of their home state.
While the majority of the soldiers despised the long marches, a few were able to see through the pain and misery and notice their surroundings. Charles Lippitt, a surgeon in Pickett’s Division wrote, “I was never more struck with the grandeur of mountain scenery than on this march. No other scenery can equal it.”
Also on June 18, Colonel John Mosby captured a Federal courier. The courier was carrying dispatches with the positions of the entire Union army from June 17, as well as the orders for the next day. This information was then sent to General Lee.
Between June 19-21, 1863, the Union and Confederate armies would concentrate near the Potomac River. The 2 armies, which had been fairly spread out up to this point, now had elements within 6 miles of each other. The next week and a half will contain a whirlwind of events for both armies; a major change in command for the Union, questionable decision making by Southern commanders, and a 3-day battle that will make-or-break the hopes of the Confederate States of America.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
The Gettysburg Campaign (June 14 - 15, 1863)
“The enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them?”, President Lincoln wrote to General Hooker on June 14, 1863.
“If the head of Lee’s army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the Plank Road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?”
Lincoln’s words were lost on Hooker. After Chancellorsville, Hooker’s confidence plummeted. Even worse, some of Hooker’s officers openly questioned his leadership. Some officers were actually planning to overthrow Hooker, while others tried to position themselves to be his successor. So, even if Hooker planned an attack to slice Lee’s army in two, the success of the attack would have hinged on officers that had absolutely no faith in their commanding officer. On top of that, the enlisted men were still shaken up from Chancellorsville. An attack by Hooker in mid-June on Lee’s army could have been disastrous. Lee’s army was spread out, but so was Hooker’s. At best, Hooker would only be able to throw in a Corps or two at any given point along Lee’s line. The mindset of Lee’s army was completely opposite of Hooker’s. The Confederates were eager, confident, and had a huge morale boost from the victory at Chancellorsville. Lee himself thought of his army as “invincible”. An attack on Lee’s army would have put the Confederates in a defensive position, and the result could very well have been on the scale of Fredericksburg.
On June 14th, Hooker’s entire army was on the move northward. June 14th marks the beginning of some brutal marches endured by the Army of The Potomac. Due to Hooker’s cautiousness, his army was significantly behind Lee’s. The only way to make up the ground was to march the army night and day. The Union I and III Corps began their march towards Manassas Junction around 4AM on June 14th. The III Corps stopped around midnight, 9 miles outside of Manassas Junction. The I Corps wasn’t so lucky; they continued marching through the night. After a 20-mile march, the Union V Corps reached Catlett’s Station around 7PM. A soldier in Weed’s brigade recalled that “some of the men fell out of the ranks, just as thought they had been shot.” The VI Corps assembled at Stafford Court House and marched through the night of June 14th and into the early morning hours of June 15th. The XII Corps completed an all-night march on June 13th-14th, stopping at Dumfries around 9AM. The II Corps finally broke camp, but did not make much progress during the day on June 14th.
The conditions were awful for these forced marches. Roads were congested, and the dust hung in the air, making it difficult to breathe. There was a serious lack of water, too. Men noted marching 20 or more miles on a single fill-up of their canteens. According to John Halsey of the 17th Maine, part of Colonel Philippe de Trobriand’s brigade, “it is difficult to get sufficient water for drinking, and as for ablutions, a mud puddle would be deemed an inestimable treasure.” Marching during the night presented other problems for the troops. One Union soldier listed the hazards as “falling off bridges, stumbling into ditches, tearing the face and injuring the eyes against the bushes and projecting limbs of trees often sprung back from a soldier ahead.”
During the evening of June 14th, General Albert Jenkins cavalry brigade (under Gen. Stuart), received orders to ride to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Jenkins moved out early the next morning, and by 11:00PM on June 15th had his troopers riding through the streets of Chambersburg. Hearing the news of the approaching Confederates, bankers and storekeepers of Chambersburg hid their valuables, or sent them further to the north.
The Confederate II Corps wrapped up their victory at the Battle of Second Winchester on June 15th. The rest of the Army of Northern Virginia resumed its march northward through the Shenandoah Valley. Gen. Rodes’ division (II Corps) reached the Potomac River by 11PM that evening across from Williamsport, Maryland. Rodes sent the brigades of Stephen Ramseur, Alfred Iverson, and George Doles across the river, along with 3 artillery batteries.
The Army of The Potomac finally regrouped around Centreville on June 15th. Most of the men had just marched 25 miles in nearly 20 hours. The roads leading to Centreville we littered with blankets, knapsacks, rations and anything else soldiers felt would lighten their loads. During the next 48 hours, Union patrols fanned out looking for evidence of enemy movement. Unknown to the patrols at the time, the nearest Confederate force was 26 miles away.
By the end of June 15th , portions of the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac River and entered Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Army of The Potomac had reestablished its nucleus around Centreville, and the rearguard of Lee’s army had finally left Fredericksburg behind and were now joining the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia.
“If the head of Lee’s army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the Plank Road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?”
Lincoln’s words were lost on Hooker. After Chancellorsville, Hooker’s confidence plummeted. Even worse, some of Hooker’s officers openly questioned his leadership. Some officers were actually planning to overthrow Hooker, while others tried to position themselves to be his successor. So, even if Hooker planned an attack to slice Lee’s army in two, the success of the attack would have hinged on officers that had absolutely no faith in their commanding officer. On top of that, the enlisted men were still shaken up from Chancellorsville. An attack by Hooker in mid-June on Lee’s army could have been disastrous. Lee’s army was spread out, but so was Hooker’s. At best, Hooker would only be able to throw in a Corps or two at any given point along Lee’s line. The mindset of Lee’s army was completely opposite of Hooker’s. The Confederates were eager, confident, and had a huge morale boost from the victory at Chancellorsville. Lee himself thought of his army as “invincible”. An attack on Lee’s army would have put the Confederates in a defensive position, and the result could very well have been on the scale of Fredericksburg.
On June 14th, Hooker’s entire army was on the move northward. June 14th marks the beginning of some brutal marches endured by the Army of The Potomac. Due to Hooker’s cautiousness, his army was significantly behind Lee’s. The only way to make up the ground was to march the army night and day. The Union I and III Corps began their march towards Manassas Junction around 4AM on June 14th. The III Corps stopped around midnight, 9 miles outside of Manassas Junction. The I Corps wasn’t so lucky; they continued marching through the night. After a 20-mile march, the Union V Corps reached Catlett’s Station around 7PM. A soldier in Weed’s brigade recalled that “some of the men fell out of the ranks, just as thought they had been shot.” The VI Corps assembled at Stafford Court House and marched through the night of June 14th and into the early morning hours of June 15th. The XII Corps completed an all-night march on June 13th-14th, stopping at Dumfries around 9AM. The II Corps finally broke camp, but did not make much progress during the day on June 14th.
The conditions were awful for these forced marches. Roads were congested, and the dust hung in the air, making it difficult to breathe. There was a serious lack of water, too. Men noted marching 20 or more miles on a single fill-up of their canteens. According to John Halsey of the 17th Maine, part of Colonel Philippe de Trobriand’s brigade, “it is difficult to get sufficient water for drinking, and as for ablutions, a mud puddle would be deemed an inestimable treasure.” Marching during the night presented other problems for the troops. One Union soldier listed the hazards as “falling off bridges, stumbling into ditches, tearing the face and injuring the eyes against the bushes and projecting limbs of trees often sprung back from a soldier ahead.”
During the evening of June 14th, General Albert Jenkins cavalry brigade (under Gen. Stuart), received orders to ride to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Jenkins moved out early the next morning, and by 11:00PM on June 15th had his troopers riding through the streets of Chambersburg. Hearing the news of the approaching Confederates, bankers and storekeepers of Chambersburg hid their valuables, or sent them further to the north.
The Confederate II Corps wrapped up their victory at the Battle of Second Winchester on June 15th. The rest of the Army of Northern Virginia resumed its march northward through the Shenandoah Valley. Gen. Rodes’ division (II Corps) reached the Potomac River by 11PM that evening across from Williamsport, Maryland. Rodes sent the brigades of Stephen Ramseur, Alfred Iverson, and George Doles across the river, along with 3 artillery batteries.
The Army of The Potomac finally regrouped around Centreville on June 15th. Most of the men had just marched 25 miles in nearly 20 hours. The roads leading to Centreville we littered with blankets, knapsacks, rations and anything else soldiers felt would lighten their loads. During the next 48 hours, Union patrols fanned out looking for evidence of enemy movement. Unknown to the patrols at the time, the nearest Confederate force was 26 miles away.
By the end of June 15th , portions of the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac River and entered Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Army of The Potomac had reestablished its nucleus around Centreville, and the rearguard of Lee’s army had finally left Fredericksburg behind and were now joining the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Monday, June 13, 2011
The Gettysburg Campaign (June 3 - 13, 1863)
The Army of Northern Virginia was at its zenith in the late spring and early summer of 1863. Their commander, General Robert E. Lee, decided to gamble the fate of his army of 75,000 on the hopes of invading the north, scoring a significant victory, and bringing President Lincoln to his knees. Lee wasn't looking for another battle; Lee was looking for a victory that would effectively end the war. With one more great victory, foreign powers might intervene and conduct mediation between the United States and a newly-formed Confederate States government. The destruction of the Army of The Potomac was one of the primary objectives, and Lee and his soldiers had almost accomplished this task before the Gettysburg Campaign had even started.
In December of 1862, Lee positioned his army overlooking the town of Fredericksburg, Virginia. General Ambrose Burnside, commander of the Army of The Potomac, launched an attack against the Confederate troops positioned on the heights outside of the town. The attack failed, resulting in thousands of Union casualties. Again, in January of 1863, Burnside attempted another offensive maneuver against Lee, but the winter rains and conditions of the roads ultimately bogged down the operation. Burnside’s second attempt at dislodging Lee had been a failure, even without a battle. On January 26, 1863, President Lincoln accepted Burnside’s resignation.
General “Fighting” Joe Hooker was Burnside’s replacement. In fact, after Hooker took command, the morale of the Army of The Potomac soared to new levels. Hooker rearranged the diets of the soldiers, made camp sanitary changes, improved the army’s quartermaster system, and modified the furlough system for soldiers returning home. Additionally, Hooker introduced stronger officer training, drilled soldiers more, and combined all of the Union cavalry into a single Corp. The Union soldiers felt confidence in their new leader, and believed that great things were on the horizon. The Battle of Chancellorsville (4/30 - 5/6/1863) would derail Hooker’s position as commander of the Army of The Potomac. “Lee’s Perfect Battle” destroyed Union morale, but at a great cost. General “Stonewall” Jackson was wounded by his own troops at the height of his flanking attack, and would later have his arm amputated. Jackson developed pneumonia, and died a few days later.
Now was the perfect time to strike. Lee’s plan was bold; advance up the Shenandoah Valley, threaten Washington DC, Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia. Along the way, Confederate soldiers could live off of the rich farmlands in Maryland and Pennsylvania, giving Virginia farmers a chance to grow crops and maintain livestock once again.
On June 3, 1863, Lee’s army began to slip away from Fredericksburg in fragments. A.P. Hill’s III Corp was left behind to protect the Confederate rear, while General Longstreet’s I Corp and General Ewell’s II Corp marched to the west and north. General Hooker sensed there was movement, and ordered General Sedgwick to probe Hill’s line. After a spirited skirmish, Sedgwick convinced himself, and Hooker, that Lee still occupied the line with the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee halted General’s Longstreet and Ewell briefly, fearing a Union assault. When it appeared that Hooker would not press the issue, Lee once again mobilized his army.
On June 8, 1863, General Lee’s cavalry commander, General J.E.B. Stuart, held a grand review near Brandy Station, Virginia. Over 9,000 Confederate troopers would pass in front of General Stuart and his commander, General Lee. Stuart’s cavalry would be a crucial component to Lee’s invasion plan. Stuart’s primary objective was to shield the Army of Northern Virginia from observation or interference as it moved north. Lee also ordered Stuart to raid Union positions, and to disrupt Union supply lines.
On June 9, 1863, Union cavalry surprised the Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station. The battle resulted in a draw, although General Stuart boasted the engagement was a Confederate victory because his troops held the field at the end of the day. For the first time during the war, Union cavalry matched the skills of the Confederate cavalry in a battle. For Stuart, Brandy Station must have been a blow to his ego. The Confederate cavalry was hit with a surprise-attack; the kind of attack the cavalry is supposed to prevent. The Battle of Brandy Station was the largest cavalry engagement on North American soil. The battle was also embarrassing for Stuart, and put into motion a chain of events that would end up hurting the Army of Northern Virginia instead of aiding it.
June 13, 1863 found both armies on the move. General’s Longstreet and Ewell were filtering into the Shenandoah valley, while General Hooker was pursuing cautiously. In fact, Hooker had divided his army into 2 wings; the left wing, commanded by Major General John F. Reynolds, would pursue the Army of Northern Virginia, while the right wing remained behind to collect and cover the withdraw of government property. The Union I (Reynolds), III (Sickles), V (Sykes), and XI (Howard) Corp marched North-West towards the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The Union VI (Sedgwick) and XII (Slocum) Corp marched North towards Dumfries, Virginia, and the Union II (Hancock) Corp remained behind to cover the Union rear. The Army of Northern Virginia was less active on this day. General Hill’s III Corp prepared to break camp around Fredericksburg, while Ewell’s II Corp continued north, engaging the Union garrison at the Second Battle of Winchester (6/13-6/15). General Longstreet’s Corp was given a day of rest. By the end of June 13, Union and Confederate forces were scattered from the Shenandoah Valley to Fredericksburg, Virginia.
In December of 1862, Lee positioned his army overlooking the town of Fredericksburg, Virginia. General Ambrose Burnside, commander of the Army of The Potomac, launched an attack against the Confederate troops positioned on the heights outside of the town. The attack failed, resulting in thousands of Union casualties. Again, in January of 1863, Burnside attempted another offensive maneuver against Lee, but the winter rains and conditions of the roads ultimately bogged down the operation. Burnside’s second attempt at dislodging Lee had been a failure, even without a battle. On January 26, 1863, President Lincoln accepted Burnside’s resignation.
General “Fighting” Joe Hooker was Burnside’s replacement. In fact, after Hooker took command, the morale of the Army of The Potomac soared to new levels. Hooker rearranged the diets of the soldiers, made camp sanitary changes, improved the army’s quartermaster system, and modified the furlough system for soldiers returning home. Additionally, Hooker introduced stronger officer training, drilled soldiers more, and combined all of the Union cavalry into a single Corp. The Union soldiers felt confidence in their new leader, and believed that great things were on the horizon. The Battle of Chancellorsville (4/30 - 5/6/1863) would derail Hooker’s position as commander of the Army of The Potomac. “Lee’s Perfect Battle” destroyed Union morale, but at a great cost. General “Stonewall” Jackson was wounded by his own troops at the height of his flanking attack, and would later have his arm amputated. Jackson developed pneumonia, and died a few days later.
Now was the perfect time to strike. Lee’s plan was bold; advance up the Shenandoah Valley, threaten Washington DC, Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia. Along the way, Confederate soldiers could live off of the rich farmlands in Maryland and Pennsylvania, giving Virginia farmers a chance to grow crops and maintain livestock once again.
On June 3, 1863, Lee’s army began to slip away from Fredericksburg in fragments. A.P. Hill’s III Corp was left behind to protect the Confederate rear, while General Longstreet’s I Corp and General Ewell’s II Corp marched to the west and north. General Hooker sensed there was movement, and ordered General Sedgwick to probe Hill’s line. After a spirited skirmish, Sedgwick convinced himself, and Hooker, that Lee still occupied the line with the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee halted General’s Longstreet and Ewell briefly, fearing a Union assault. When it appeared that Hooker would not press the issue, Lee once again mobilized his army.
On June 8, 1863, General Lee’s cavalry commander, General J.E.B. Stuart, held a grand review near Brandy Station, Virginia. Over 9,000 Confederate troopers would pass in front of General Stuart and his commander, General Lee. Stuart’s cavalry would be a crucial component to Lee’s invasion plan. Stuart’s primary objective was to shield the Army of Northern Virginia from observation or interference as it moved north. Lee also ordered Stuart to raid Union positions, and to disrupt Union supply lines.
On June 9, 1863, Union cavalry surprised the Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station. The battle resulted in a draw, although General Stuart boasted the engagement was a Confederate victory because his troops held the field at the end of the day. For the first time during the war, Union cavalry matched the skills of the Confederate cavalry in a battle. For Stuart, Brandy Station must have been a blow to his ego. The Confederate cavalry was hit with a surprise-attack; the kind of attack the cavalry is supposed to prevent. The Battle of Brandy Station was the largest cavalry engagement on North American soil. The battle was also embarrassing for Stuart, and put into motion a chain of events that would end up hurting the Army of Northern Virginia instead of aiding it.
June 13, 1863 found both armies on the move. General’s Longstreet and Ewell were filtering into the Shenandoah valley, while General Hooker was pursuing cautiously. In fact, Hooker had divided his army into 2 wings; the left wing, commanded by Major General John F. Reynolds, would pursue the Army of Northern Virginia, while the right wing remained behind to collect and cover the withdraw of government property. The Union I (Reynolds), III (Sickles), V (Sykes), and XI (Howard) Corp marched North-West towards the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The Union VI (Sedgwick) and XII (Slocum) Corp marched North towards Dumfries, Virginia, and the Union II (Hancock) Corp remained behind to cover the Union rear. The Army of Northern Virginia was less active on this day. General Hill’s III Corp prepared to break camp around Fredericksburg, while Ewell’s II Corp continued north, engaging the Union garrison at the Second Battle of Winchester (6/13-6/15). General Longstreet’s Corp was given a day of rest. By the end of June 13, Union and Confederate forces were scattered from the Shenandoah Valley to Fredericksburg, Virginia.
Monday, June 6, 2011
"Gettysburg" - A Review - Part 3
Take a deep breath. Here we go.
July 3rd, 1863 is one of the most important days in American history. A massive artillery bombardment, followed by thousands of Confederate soldiers marching across a mile-wide valley to meet destiny and disaster on the west slope of Cemetery Ridge. So how well is it portrayed on TV?
The majority of the fighting on Culp’s Hill ends around 12:00AM, July 3rd. Confederate soldiers now occupy a good portion of the breastworks built up by the Union’s 12th Corp and remnants of the 1st and 11th Corp. Culp’s Hill continues to be the highlight of this entire program.
Now Rebel troops are gaining ground on lower Culp’s Hill.
I was blown away when the narrator said this. It’s one thing to get the fighting right, but to label the topography correctly is incredible. Culp’s Hill is actually 2 hills, “upper” Culp’s Hill (where the modern observation tower sits), and “lower” Culp’s Hill (around Spangler’s Spring and Pardee Field). I have to ask the question again: Why is Culp’s Hill continuing to be the only thing portrayed correctly in the program up to this point? I have no idea, but I guess it’s better to get one thing right than to get everything absolutely wrong.
The fighting on Culp’s Hill now follows 2 individuals; a private from the 1st Maryland Battalion (CS), and a colonel from the 1st Maryland (US). Ridgley Howard, the private fighting for the Confederacy, is struck by a bullet in the thigh. As he pulls himself up to sit against a tree, another bullet slams into his hip. After the fighting dies down, Howard receives help from an unlikely source. Soldiers of the 1st Maryland (US) rush down the slope to gather their fellow Marylanders. Just moments before, both sides were trying to kill each other. Now, only acts of mercy and compassion are shared between both Maryland units. Unfortunately, Culp’s Hill ends here. The brightest spot of the program lasts a disappointing 12 minutes.
OK. Here we go.
The narrator introduces us to Lee’s plan to attack the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. I immediately notice something that looks odd; a shot of Union artillery on Cemetery Ridge, placed so close together that the guns are only 4-5 feet apart. I don’t know much about artillery, but I do know that you shouldn’t place them so ridiculously close together. If the artillery actually formed up this way during the war, one good shot could take out 3 or 4 artillery crews at once.
The artillery finally opens up. This is when the program basically raises the middle finger to all the viewers. Yeah, you like this? You have 20 more minutes to sit through, and I am going to make this as painful as possible! Cannon barrels flop around like they're made of rubber; some guns recoil, while others sit completely still; crews stand alongside guns that are firing as if nothing is even happening. My point - it looks terrible.
Cease fire!
Who the hell just said that? Some random lieutenant standing between 2 cannons?! Wow. Gen. Henry Hunt, Chief of Artillery for the Army of The Potomac, ordered his artillery to stop firing. He did this for 2 reasons; to save ammunition for the infantry assault he knew was coming, and to lure the Confederates into thinking that his artillery had been crippled during the bombardment. It works.
Now we’re looking into the eyes of Brig. Gen. Joseph Davis. As he stares across the fields towards the Union position, he develops a strange look on his face. He doesn’t look worried or concerned, just really confused. Instead of reacting to the situation that lies in front of him, it appears as though Davis is watching a leprechaun ride a unicorn through fields of cotton candy and rainbows. It’s almost comical. By this point, you’re just done with the whole “documentary” thing. I actually burst into laughter when I saw his face. How terrible is that?
Davis gives his brigade the order to advance. The cameras pull back to show the brigade in form…forma…formatio…THE CAMERAS PULL BACK TO SHOW THE BRIGADE IN A FORMATION THAT IS TOTALLY WRONG AND MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO SENSE!
Ok, try to follow me on this one. Instead of marching in a battle line, it shows Davis’ brigade in a weird column. I say “column” because I have no other way of describing it. Below is what you would have seen during Pickett’s Charge - 2 rows of soldiers in a battle line:
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(Front)
Below is how the soldiers march in the program:
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(Front)
That’s just ignorant. There is no way you can convince me that not one single person on the set had any idea of what a battle line looked like. Inexcusable, and unforgivable.
During the advance, Davis has about 30 shells explode around his feet, knocking everyone down around him. But not Davis. Davis continues on, turning around with every explosion. I’m not sure if they intended it to look this way, but he also walks like he just pooped his trousers.
Stopping to fire in an open field is suicide. But there’s no point, their muskets are out of range.
Thanks, narrator. That information is great. It’s such a weird comment that I can’t even decipher if it actually means anything or not.
Wait a second…
What is that on Davis’ left flank? Is that a mountain? Yep. It is. What are the chances that this film crew actually cared about the location of where this was shot? I’m going to say “none”. So, there you have it viewers, Davis’ left flank was protected by Mount Everest during Pickett’s Charge.
Davis’ brigade now approaches the Emmitsburg Road. On the other side of the road should be a gentle rise up to a stone wall with thousands of Union soldiers standing their ground. What do we get on TV? A line of Union soldiers standing on the other side of the Emmitsburg Road, not more than 15 feet away, shooting into the Confederate soldiers as they lay down in front of the fence. Oh, and there’s cannons and caissons near the fence, too. I could save the day by throwing in the fact that Union artillery was overrun near the Emmitsburg Road during the fighting on July 2nd, but there is no way in hell that this production crew could have ever thought of this. If they did, it had to be by accident.
Woah.
What did I just see?
IS THAT A PAIR OF TENNIS SHOES ON A SOLDIER?!
At this point, I shouldn’t even care. But, I have to include it because it’s so bad. A Confederate soldiers jumps over the fence along the Emmitsburg Road. The bottom of his shoe is white, and the laces appear to be modern. To top it off, there is a “loop” on the heel of the shoe (like some modern shoes have) to assist in putting the shoe on. Basically, it looks like a pair of Converses that were spray painted black (but with a white sole). Incredible.
As it turns out, the “stone wall” is only 10 feet away from the Emmitsburg Road. Union soldiers stand there, gunning down the Confederates as they cross over the road. And by “stone wall”, I mean flat, open ground. Have any of these people actually seen ANY of the terrain at Gettysburg?
Only 7 more minutes to go. We can do this.
Finally, a shot of the actual stone wall. And guess what? They got it wrong.
HOW CAN YOU GET A STONE WALL WRONG?
It takes a special person/team to botch something as simple as a stone wall. This is going to be a tough one to describe. The stone wall runs north-to-south along the spine of Cemetery Ridge. At one point, the wall cuts 90 degrees to the east for several hundred feet, then cuts 90 degrees to the north, forming "The Angle". In the program, the stone wall is depicted opposite of how it actually looks. Instead of the angle being north of the "Copse of Trees", it's actually south of them. Oh, and there's a fictional mountain behind the Union lines, too.
I had to add in the “Fictional Mountain” because, just like in the shots with Davis, there is a huge mountain in the background that absolutely doesn’t (and never did) exist. The only neat part about the depiction of Pickett’s Charge is the hand-to-hand fighting. I’d like to think that the actors/reenactors were told something like this:
Okay guys, we’re going to wrap up filming today with some hand-to-hand combat over the stone wall. You guys have been great, so to show you our level of appreciation, we’re gonna give you a sneak peak of “Gettysburg” before we shoot the combat scenes. Gather ‘round. This is what you’ve sacrificed family and personal time for…
Then emotions boiled over. The level of frustration went through the roof, and men started acting like animals. Punching, kicking, stabbing and clawing at one another in an effort to make “Gettysburg” simply “Go Away”. The crew, vigilant as ever, turned the cameras on and caught the intensity of men in combat.
The amount of fiction that I just hammered out doesn’t even compare to the amount of fiction the Scotts put into this program. Authors were offended, Civil War enthusiasts were offended, teachers were offended, and I’m offended, because this program is one of the worst representations of Gettysburg that I have ever seen. If you haven’t seen this program, you have to. I know, I just carved it to pieces, BUT IT’S THAT BAD. It’s something you have to experience. I hope the errors in this program encourage others to research and learn about the battle. If more people end up reading books because of this program, then something good came out of this mess. Sadly, that’s about it. Other than a few first person accounts, and the shots of Culp’s Hill, the whole thing is a jumbled tragedy that wants to call itself “Gettysburg”.
The History Channel should be ashamed of itself, as well as the entire production team. This is, without a doubt, one of the most misleading and false documentary’s I have ever seen.
July 3rd, 1863 is one of the most important days in American history. A massive artillery bombardment, followed by thousands of Confederate soldiers marching across a mile-wide valley to meet destiny and disaster on the west slope of Cemetery Ridge. So how well is it portrayed on TV?
The majority of the fighting on Culp’s Hill ends around 12:00AM, July 3rd. Confederate soldiers now occupy a good portion of the breastworks built up by the Union’s 12th Corp and remnants of the 1st and 11th Corp. Culp’s Hill continues to be the highlight of this entire program.
Now Rebel troops are gaining ground on lower Culp’s Hill.
I was blown away when the narrator said this. It’s one thing to get the fighting right, but to label the topography correctly is incredible. Culp’s Hill is actually 2 hills, “upper” Culp’s Hill (where the modern observation tower sits), and “lower” Culp’s Hill (around Spangler’s Spring and Pardee Field). I have to ask the question again: Why is Culp’s Hill continuing to be the only thing portrayed correctly in the program up to this point? I have no idea, but I guess it’s better to get one thing right than to get everything absolutely wrong.
The fighting on Culp’s Hill now follows 2 individuals; a private from the 1st Maryland Battalion (CS), and a colonel from the 1st Maryland (US). Ridgley Howard, the private fighting for the Confederacy, is struck by a bullet in the thigh. As he pulls himself up to sit against a tree, another bullet slams into his hip. After the fighting dies down, Howard receives help from an unlikely source. Soldiers of the 1st Maryland (US) rush down the slope to gather their fellow Marylanders. Just moments before, both sides were trying to kill each other. Now, only acts of mercy and compassion are shared between both Maryland units. Unfortunately, Culp’s Hill ends here. The brightest spot of the program lasts a disappointing 12 minutes.
OK. Here we go.
The narrator introduces us to Lee’s plan to attack the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. I immediately notice something that looks odd; a shot of Union artillery on Cemetery Ridge, placed so close together that the guns are only 4-5 feet apart. I don’t know much about artillery, but I do know that you shouldn’t place them so ridiculously close together. If the artillery actually formed up this way during the war, one good shot could take out 3 or 4 artillery crews at once.
The artillery finally opens up. This is when the program basically raises the middle finger to all the viewers. Yeah, you like this? You have 20 more minutes to sit through, and I am going to make this as painful as possible! Cannon barrels flop around like they're made of rubber; some guns recoil, while others sit completely still; crews stand alongside guns that are firing as if nothing is even happening. My point - it looks terrible.
Cease fire!
Who the hell just said that? Some random lieutenant standing between 2 cannons?! Wow. Gen. Henry Hunt, Chief of Artillery for the Army of The Potomac, ordered his artillery to stop firing. He did this for 2 reasons; to save ammunition for the infantry assault he knew was coming, and to lure the Confederates into thinking that his artillery had been crippled during the bombardment. It works.
Now we’re looking into the eyes of Brig. Gen. Joseph Davis. As he stares across the fields towards the Union position, he develops a strange look on his face. He doesn’t look worried or concerned, just really confused. Instead of reacting to the situation that lies in front of him, it appears as though Davis is watching a leprechaun ride a unicorn through fields of cotton candy and rainbows. It’s almost comical. By this point, you’re just done with the whole “documentary” thing. I actually burst into laughter when I saw his face. How terrible is that?
Davis gives his brigade the order to advance. The cameras pull back to show the brigade in form…forma…formatio…THE CAMERAS PULL BACK TO SHOW THE BRIGADE IN A FORMATION THAT IS TOTALLY WRONG AND MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO SENSE!
Ok, try to follow me on this one. Instead of marching in a battle line, it shows Davis’ brigade in a weird column. I say “column” because I have no other way of describing it. Below is what you would have seen during Pickett’s Charge - 2 rows of soldiers in a battle line:
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(Front)
Below is how the soldiers march in the program:
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* * * * * * *
(Front)
That’s just ignorant. There is no way you can convince me that not one single person on the set had any idea of what a battle line looked like. Inexcusable, and unforgivable.
During the advance, Davis has about 30 shells explode around his feet, knocking everyone down around him. But not Davis. Davis continues on, turning around with every explosion. I’m not sure if they intended it to look this way, but he also walks like he just pooped his trousers.
Stopping to fire in an open field is suicide. But there’s no point, their muskets are out of range.
Thanks, narrator. That information is great. It’s such a weird comment that I can’t even decipher if it actually means anything or not.
Wait a second…
What is that on Davis’ left flank? Is that a mountain? Yep. It is. What are the chances that this film crew actually cared about the location of where this was shot? I’m going to say “none”. So, there you have it viewers, Davis’ left flank was protected by Mount Everest during Pickett’s Charge.
Davis’ brigade now approaches the Emmitsburg Road. On the other side of the road should be a gentle rise up to a stone wall with thousands of Union soldiers standing their ground. What do we get on TV? A line of Union soldiers standing on the other side of the Emmitsburg Road, not more than 15 feet away, shooting into the Confederate soldiers as they lay down in front of the fence. Oh, and there’s cannons and caissons near the fence, too. I could save the day by throwing in the fact that Union artillery was overrun near the Emmitsburg Road during the fighting on July 2nd, but there is no way in hell that this production crew could have ever thought of this. If they did, it had to be by accident.
Woah.
What did I just see?
IS THAT A PAIR OF TENNIS SHOES ON A SOLDIER?!
At this point, I shouldn’t even care. But, I have to include it because it’s so bad. A Confederate soldiers jumps over the fence along the Emmitsburg Road. The bottom of his shoe is white, and the laces appear to be modern. To top it off, there is a “loop” on the heel of the shoe (like some modern shoes have) to assist in putting the shoe on. Basically, it looks like a pair of Converses that were spray painted black (but with a white sole). Incredible.
As it turns out, the “stone wall” is only 10 feet away from the Emmitsburg Road. Union soldiers stand there, gunning down the Confederates as they cross over the road. And by “stone wall”, I mean flat, open ground. Have any of these people actually seen ANY of the terrain at Gettysburg?
Only 7 more minutes to go. We can do this.
Finally, a shot of the actual stone wall. And guess what? They got it wrong.
HOW CAN YOU GET A STONE WALL WRONG?
It takes a special person/team to botch something as simple as a stone wall. This is going to be a tough one to describe. The stone wall runs north-to-south along the spine of Cemetery Ridge. At one point, the wall cuts 90 degrees to the east for several hundred feet, then cuts 90 degrees to the north, forming "The Angle". In the program, the stone wall is depicted opposite of how it actually looks. Instead of the angle being north of the "Copse of Trees", it's actually south of them. Oh, and there's a fictional mountain behind the Union lines, too.
I had to add in the “Fictional Mountain” because, just like in the shots with Davis, there is a huge mountain in the background that absolutely doesn’t (and never did) exist. The only neat part about the depiction of Pickett’s Charge is the hand-to-hand fighting. I’d like to think that the actors/reenactors were told something like this:
Okay guys, we’re going to wrap up filming today with some hand-to-hand combat over the stone wall. You guys have been great, so to show you our level of appreciation, we’re gonna give you a sneak peak of “Gettysburg” before we shoot the combat scenes. Gather ‘round. This is what you’ve sacrificed family and personal time for…
Then emotions boiled over. The level of frustration went through the roof, and men started acting like animals. Punching, kicking, stabbing and clawing at one another in an effort to make “Gettysburg” simply “Go Away”. The crew, vigilant as ever, turned the cameras on and caught the intensity of men in combat.
The amount of fiction that I just hammered out doesn’t even compare to the amount of fiction the Scotts put into this program. Authors were offended, Civil War enthusiasts were offended, teachers were offended, and I’m offended, because this program is one of the worst representations of Gettysburg that I have ever seen. If you haven’t seen this program, you have to. I know, I just carved it to pieces, BUT IT’S THAT BAD. It’s something you have to experience. I hope the errors in this program encourage others to research and learn about the battle. If more people end up reading books because of this program, then something good came out of this mess. Sadly, that’s about it. Other than a few first person accounts, and the shots of Culp’s Hill, the whole thing is a jumbled tragedy that wants to call itself “Gettysburg”.
The History Channel should be ashamed of itself, as well as the entire production team. This is, without a doubt, one of the most misleading and false documentary’s I have ever seen.
Saturday, June 4, 2011
"Gettysburg" - A Review - Part 2
Day 2 begins with the narrator describing the battle plans of the Confederate army. During this time, we are introduced to Confederate Gen. Barksdale, from Mississippi. You are immediately drawn to the hideous representation of a “beard”; the look of wet, matted dog hair taped to somebody’s face. After we learn about Barksdale, I heard something that made me want to throw my remote through the TV.
People often ask me, “What if they had machine guns in the Civil War?”. I always say, “Forget all that. One set of walkie-talkies could have changed the outcome of the Civil War”.
…
…
…
SERIOUSLY!?
This is a documentary about Gettysburg! Not about “what-if” scenarios! The fact that this slipped into the actual program just blows my mind. This program is supposed to be a “documentary”. Let’s review what that actually means:
Documentary - Based on or re-creating an actual event, era, life story, etc., that purports to be factually accurate and contains no fictional elements
At this point, we’re only 45 minutes into the program (including commercials). After that comment, we can now admit to ourselves that this is not a documentary. For the last 30-some minutes, “Gettysburg” has been struggling to stay afloat on facts. When it comes to the combat, tactics, and first-person accounts, it does it’s job. But, for some reason, the Scott’s thought it was a great idea to throw in useless opinions, such as using machine guns or walkie-talkies in the Civil War. Again, this is a program called “Gettysburg”; not “Things Would Have Been Way Different If Both Sides Did Different Things: Let’s Talk About It”.
Finally, we get to 4:30PM on July 2nd. Inexplicably, it depicts the Union army initiating the combat of the second day. It’s impossible to say that the entire Union army held it’s fire until the Confederates commenced their assault, but it is general knowledge that the fighting on the southern portion of the battlefield started with Confederate batteries opening on the Union positions around Devil’s Den and the Peach Orchard. As the narrator is talking up the fight to come, we have to watch an uncomfortably long segment of Barksdale’s horse rearing, while Barksdale shouts words that are unfamiliar to us that know English - or any other real language, for that matter.
Then comes the “Rebel Yell”. Absolutely embarrassing. The camera zooms in on some awful dental hygiene, but that’s not the problem. The problem is the actual sound coming out of their mouths. Out of 7 different shots, only 1 actually sounds like the original Rebel Yell. The others sound like noises from a comedy sketch, including one where the only thing you hear is the soldier saying “Yak! Yak! Yak!” as if he were part of the Three Stooges.
The Rebel Yell fills the air. Each unit has a unique sound.
Really? If you think so, you should check out the video below (thanks to Sean Pridgeon for sharing the link):
The Rebel Yell Lives: Part 1
Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade finally attacks, and breaks through the Union positions near the Peach Orchard. The Peach Orchard is high ground between the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge and the Confederate positions on Seminary Ridge. As Barksdale’s men break through, the program depicts the soldiers running into a ravine which has a stream and a few marshy areas. I could live with this being somewhere close to Plum Run (a stream that runs north-to-south through most of the second day’s fight). However, we’re never told where this is. I’ve been studying the battle for more than 20 years, and I can’t even point out where they are. If it’s supposed to be the Peach Orchard, then the ground has inverted itself. It can’t be near the Trostle Farm, because their basically fighting in the woods and the terrain is too steep. Honestly, I can’t believe I’m sitting here trying to figure it out. I shouldn’t have to do that. If someone that loves Gettysburg as much as I do cannot figure out what’s going on during a scene, then that’s a problem.
Now, my favorite scene. After Barksdale is shot off of his horse, a wounded soldier stumbles upon his commander and attempts to give him water. The soldier grabs his canteen, swings it to the front of his body with one arm, and then proceeds to unscrew the canteen! Oh my. This isn’t a canteen from World War II. This is just getting worse. How lazy do you have to be to let something like this pass?
So, all we have are canteens with screw-tops. Should we use them? Sure, let’s use them. It’s just a canteen.
Good job, none of you. You might be saying to yourself, It’s just a canteen, but that’s my point. If you can’t get a canteen right, you’re not going to do much better with anything else.
Ironically, after blundering their way through the first 36 hours of actions at Gettysburg, the Scott’s get something right: Culp’s Hill. The location is perfect, showing the steep incline the Confederate soldiers had to deal with during the attack. Even the Union lines are represented well, with Union soldiers spaced 4-5 feet apart (this was done because most of the troops on Culp’s Hill were sent to reinforce the army’s left flank, and only a brigade was left behind to defend a position that a division held only hours before).
One of the most confusing and complicated parts of the battle is finally explained and depicted correctly. But why? What made the Scott’s want to portray Culp’s Hill correctly? I guess I’ll never know.
The next entry will conclude the fighting on Culp’s Hill, and the depiction of Pickett’s Charge. It’s the most famous assault to ever occur on American soil, so it just has to be done well, right?
Right?
…Right?
People often ask me, “What if they had machine guns in the Civil War?”. I always say, “Forget all that. One set of walkie-talkies could have changed the outcome of the Civil War”.
…
…
…
SERIOUSLY!?
This is a documentary about Gettysburg! Not about “what-if” scenarios! The fact that this slipped into the actual program just blows my mind. This program is supposed to be a “documentary”. Let’s review what that actually means:
Documentary - Based on or re-creating an actual event, era, life story, etc., that purports to be factually accurate and contains no fictional elements
At this point, we’re only 45 minutes into the program (including commercials). After that comment, we can now admit to ourselves that this is not a documentary. For the last 30-some minutes, “Gettysburg” has been struggling to stay afloat on facts. When it comes to the combat, tactics, and first-person accounts, it does it’s job. But, for some reason, the Scott’s thought it was a great idea to throw in useless opinions, such as using machine guns or walkie-talkies in the Civil War. Again, this is a program called “Gettysburg”; not “Things Would Have Been Way Different If Both Sides Did Different Things: Let’s Talk About It”.
Finally, we get to 4:30PM on July 2nd. Inexplicably, it depicts the Union army initiating the combat of the second day. It’s impossible to say that the entire Union army held it’s fire until the Confederates commenced their assault, but it is general knowledge that the fighting on the southern portion of the battlefield started with Confederate batteries opening on the Union positions around Devil’s Den and the Peach Orchard. As the narrator is talking up the fight to come, we have to watch an uncomfortably long segment of Barksdale’s horse rearing, while Barksdale shouts words that are unfamiliar to us that know English - or any other real language, for that matter.
Then comes the “Rebel Yell”. Absolutely embarrassing. The camera zooms in on some awful dental hygiene, but that’s not the problem. The problem is the actual sound coming out of their mouths. Out of 7 different shots, only 1 actually sounds like the original Rebel Yell. The others sound like noises from a comedy sketch, including one where the only thing you hear is the soldier saying “Yak! Yak! Yak!” as if he were part of the Three Stooges.
The Rebel Yell fills the air. Each unit has a unique sound.
Really? If you think so, you should check out the video below (thanks to Sean Pridgeon for sharing the link):
The Rebel Yell Lives: Part 1
Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade finally attacks, and breaks through the Union positions near the Peach Orchard. The Peach Orchard is high ground between the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge and the Confederate positions on Seminary Ridge. As Barksdale’s men break through, the program depicts the soldiers running into a ravine which has a stream and a few marshy areas. I could live with this being somewhere close to Plum Run (a stream that runs north-to-south through most of the second day’s fight). However, we’re never told where this is. I’ve been studying the battle for more than 20 years, and I can’t even point out where they are. If it’s supposed to be the Peach Orchard, then the ground has inverted itself. It can’t be near the Trostle Farm, because their basically fighting in the woods and the terrain is too steep. Honestly, I can’t believe I’m sitting here trying to figure it out. I shouldn’t have to do that. If someone that loves Gettysburg as much as I do cannot figure out what’s going on during a scene, then that’s a problem.
Now, my favorite scene. After Barksdale is shot off of his horse, a wounded soldier stumbles upon his commander and attempts to give him water. The soldier grabs his canteen, swings it to the front of his body with one arm, and then proceeds to unscrew the canteen! Oh my. This isn’t a canteen from World War II. This is just getting worse. How lazy do you have to be to let something like this pass?
So, all we have are canteens with screw-tops. Should we use them? Sure, let’s use them. It’s just a canteen.
Good job, none of you. You might be saying to yourself, It’s just a canteen, but that’s my point. If you can’t get a canteen right, you’re not going to do much better with anything else.
Ironically, after blundering their way through the first 36 hours of actions at Gettysburg, the Scott’s get something right: Culp’s Hill. The location is perfect, showing the steep incline the Confederate soldiers had to deal with during the attack. Even the Union lines are represented well, with Union soldiers spaced 4-5 feet apart (this was done because most of the troops on Culp’s Hill were sent to reinforce the army’s left flank, and only a brigade was left behind to defend a position that a division held only hours before).
One of the most confusing and complicated parts of the battle is finally explained and depicted correctly. But why? What made the Scott’s want to portray Culp’s Hill correctly? I guess I’ll never know.
The next entry will conclude the fighting on Culp’s Hill, and the depiction of Pickett’s Charge. It’s the most famous assault to ever occur on American soil, so it just has to be done well, right?
Right?
…Right?
Friday, June 3, 2011
"Gettysburg" - A Review - Part 1
A small farm town 7 miles north of the Mason-Dixon line has drawn a lot of attention over the last century and a half. From books and movies, to documentary’s and magazine articles, Gettysburg is arguably the most written-about conflict in the world. With the amount of information readily available and easy to access, it leads me to one of the most painful questions I have ever had: How many more times will Gettysburg get mangled before someone gets it right?
I am writing this in the wake of the Memorial Day airing of “Gettysburg” on the History Channel. When I first heard/saw that this was going to be a 2 hour documentary, I was excited beyond belief.
Maybe this is the documentary I’ve been waiting for. Maybe this will be the foundation for future documentary’s. Maybe I won’t get mad during this documentary like I have with others in the past.
I still thought that up to 8:59PM. The clock struck 9:00PM, and the program started. The fate of a 2 hour documentary hung in the space of 5 minutes, as the narrator promptly leads us into the first day’s fighting. July 1st, 1863 - 10:00AM.
WHAT?
Question: Where is the best place to start a story? The beginning. Ridley and Tony Scott think differently. You might be thinking, Gettysburg has been done so many times that everyone knows how the battle started. I fall into that category as well. But, you have to assume that there is at least 1 person in this world that hasn’t heard a thing about Gettysburg. Because of that, you have to tailor the program to that one person. Anyone who tuned in to this program without prior knowledge of the battle now thinks that the battle started with the Iron Brigade fighting towards the Railroad Cut. There are two facts that cannot be overlooked when talking about the fighting on the morning of July 1st:
- Cavalry commander Gen. Buford holds off Confederate attacks for nearly 2 hours, outnumbered 2 to 1.
- First Corp. commander, Gen. Reynolds, is killed while deploying his troops on McPherson’s Ridge. I don’t know how this can be overlooked, as Reynolds is the highest ranking officer to die at Gettysburg.
So, we slog through the Iron Brigade fighting in and around the Railroad Cut. Then, inexplicably, we jump to 4:30PM.
WHY?
The Iron Brigade didn’t stop at the Railroad Cut. Why not stay with the Iron Brigade as they slug it out with Pettigrew’s Brigade? You’ve already roped viewers in by talking up how awesome the Iron Brigade was, and as soon as they start to make sense of what’s happening, the program just leaves them in the dust of the Railroad Cut. The next thing we know, Union soldiers are “running” (which is portrayed by walking, zombie-like actors) through the town, with the Confederates on their heels. Oh, the Confederates…
Before I continue, I must address the Confederate impressions. If I had to sum up their uniforms in one word, I would have a hard time choosing which word to use. Awful. Terrible. Disgusting. Embarrassing. Imagine clothes that might have been worn during the gold rush, mixed with a touch of “cowboy”. Where were the jackets? Why were most of the Confederate soldiers hatless? HOW DID THESE UNIFORMS PASS ANY TYPE OF REGULATIONS? I’ve seen bad impressions before, but this program just set the bar lower than it could ever go in the reenacting community.
Now that I’ve addressed the “uniforms”, let’s get back to the fighting through town. The program now focuses on Amos Humiston. It’s a reasonable choice, as the story of Humiston will become one of the biggest human interest stories to come out of Gettysburg. But please tell me, how do we know Humiston engaged in some epic hand-to-hand combat while being “totally” surrounded. I doubt that Humiston penned an entry into a diary as he lay dying in town. Engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat before getting shot. Have no time to write name to identify myself. See ambrotype.
Do you know what would have been great? Explaining why the Union’s 1st and 11th Corp were pouring back through town! Again, if you knew absolutely nothing about Gettysburg, you’re left with the image of the Union army simply giving up and running away. The program does mention Ewell’s Corp driving the Union soldiers from their position, but the viewer never really knows why. Were they outnumbered? Did Ewell’s troops simply outfight the 11th Corp? Did the 11th Corp even put up a fight? Pick one. Your answer is better than the Scott’s.
The first day at Gettysburg is complicated. I understand that not everything can be addressed. You could have a 10 hour documentary dedicated to the fighting between 7:00AM and 6:00PM, and still not be able to fit everything in. The program highlights some locations not normally discussed, such as the fight at the Railroad Cut and the fighting through town. Ultimately, the program falls victim to itself, and can be summed up by a quote the narrator makes about the Iron Brigade‘s fight at the Railroad Cut: Dawes’ win is the exception in a day of defeats.
I will be focusing on the programs interpretation of July 2nd in my next entry. Check back soon!
I am writing this in the wake of the Memorial Day airing of “Gettysburg” on the History Channel. When I first heard/saw that this was going to be a 2 hour documentary, I was excited beyond belief.
Maybe this is the documentary I’ve been waiting for. Maybe this will be the foundation for future documentary’s. Maybe I won’t get mad during this documentary like I have with others in the past.
I still thought that up to 8:59PM. The clock struck 9:00PM, and the program started. The fate of a 2 hour documentary hung in the space of 5 minutes, as the narrator promptly leads us into the first day’s fighting. July 1st, 1863 - 10:00AM.
WHAT?
Question: Where is the best place to start a story? The beginning. Ridley and Tony Scott think differently. You might be thinking, Gettysburg has been done so many times that everyone knows how the battle started. I fall into that category as well. But, you have to assume that there is at least 1 person in this world that hasn’t heard a thing about Gettysburg. Because of that, you have to tailor the program to that one person. Anyone who tuned in to this program without prior knowledge of the battle now thinks that the battle started with the Iron Brigade fighting towards the Railroad Cut. There are two facts that cannot be overlooked when talking about the fighting on the morning of July 1st:
- Cavalry commander Gen. Buford holds off Confederate attacks for nearly 2 hours, outnumbered 2 to 1.
- First Corp. commander, Gen. Reynolds, is killed while deploying his troops on McPherson’s Ridge. I don’t know how this can be overlooked, as Reynolds is the highest ranking officer to die at Gettysburg.
So, we slog through the Iron Brigade fighting in and around the Railroad Cut. Then, inexplicably, we jump to 4:30PM.
WHY?
The Iron Brigade didn’t stop at the Railroad Cut. Why not stay with the Iron Brigade as they slug it out with Pettigrew’s Brigade? You’ve already roped viewers in by talking up how awesome the Iron Brigade was, and as soon as they start to make sense of what’s happening, the program just leaves them in the dust of the Railroad Cut. The next thing we know, Union soldiers are “running” (which is portrayed by walking, zombie-like actors) through the town, with the Confederates on their heels. Oh, the Confederates…
Before I continue, I must address the Confederate impressions. If I had to sum up their uniforms in one word, I would have a hard time choosing which word to use. Awful. Terrible. Disgusting. Embarrassing. Imagine clothes that might have been worn during the gold rush, mixed with a touch of “cowboy”. Where were the jackets? Why were most of the Confederate soldiers hatless? HOW DID THESE UNIFORMS PASS ANY TYPE OF REGULATIONS? I’ve seen bad impressions before, but this program just set the bar lower than it could ever go in the reenacting community.
Now that I’ve addressed the “uniforms”, let’s get back to the fighting through town. The program now focuses on Amos Humiston. It’s a reasonable choice, as the story of Humiston will become one of the biggest human interest stories to come out of Gettysburg. But please tell me, how do we know Humiston engaged in some epic hand-to-hand combat while being “totally” surrounded. I doubt that Humiston penned an entry into a diary as he lay dying in town. Engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat before getting shot. Have no time to write name to identify myself. See ambrotype.
Do you know what would have been great? Explaining why the Union’s 1st and 11th Corp were pouring back through town! Again, if you knew absolutely nothing about Gettysburg, you’re left with the image of the Union army simply giving up and running away. The program does mention Ewell’s Corp driving the Union soldiers from their position, but the viewer never really knows why. Were they outnumbered? Did Ewell’s troops simply outfight the 11th Corp? Did the 11th Corp even put up a fight? Pick one. Your answer is better than the Scott’s.
The first day at Gettysburg is complicated. I understand that not everything can be addressed. You could have a 10 hour documentary dedicated to the fighting between 7:00AM and 6:00PM, and still not be able to fit everything in. The program highlights some locations not normally discussed, such as the fight at the Railroad Cut and the fighting through town. Ultimately, the program falls victim to itself, and can be summed up by a quote the narrator makes about the Iron Brigade‘s fight at the Railroad Cut: Dawes’ win is the exception in a day of defeats.
I will be focusing on the programs interpretation of July 2nd in my next entry. Check back soon!
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