July 3, 1863 - 11:00PM
Silence.
Relatively speaking, of course. The town of Gettysburg was still buzzing with activity, but for the first time in almost 72 hours, the battlefield was still. July 3rd had been quite a day for both the Army of Northern Virginia, as well as the Army of The Potomac. Lee had risked everything, just as he had at Chancellorsville two months before. Only this time, he lost.
Lee knew this campaign ran the risk of losing a significant amount of fighting men. He certainly did not expect to lose some of his best commanders; Barksdale was dead, Hood was seriously wounded, Avery was killed, Archer was captured, Longstreet had been borderline-insubordinate, and Pickett lost all three of his brigade commanders - not to mention Pickett himself was emotionally devastated. The veteran line officers the men relied upon were also picked apart. The Army of Northern Virginia was seriously wounded by July 4th, 1863, but it remained to be seen if the wound was mortal.
Meade had only been in command of the Army of The Potomac for a few days by the end of July 3rd. He had held Lee in check, and apparently defeated the invader. Before he declared a total victory, he waited for Lee’s next move. To be honest, neither commander knew if the fighting would resume on July 4th, so neither victory nor defeat was immediately declared.
Although Meade had not declared an immediate victory, Lee was already planning his retreat shortly after the repulse of the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble attack. Brigadier General John Imboden, a reliable cavalry officer, was ordered to Lee’s headquarters late on the evening of July 3rd. Imboden arrived, but Lee was not immediately available. Around 1:00AM on July 4th, Lee appeared in front of his headquarters. He was exhausted, and Imboden noted that Lee carried an “expression of sadness that I had never before seen upon his face.” Imboden also noted that Lee muttered “Too bad! Too bad! Oh! Too bad!”, seemingly to himself. Lee finally briefed Imboden on the task ahead of him. “We must now return to Virginia”, Lee said, “as many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home.”
The Army of Northern Virginia’s route north went according to plan, except for losing contact with J.E.B Stuart. Retreating from Gettysburg would be another risky maneuver. His army was tired, lacked the proper ammunition, and would have a numerically superior army chasing it to the Potomac. Lee knew the consequences of defeat, and he took every precaution so that every commander would be on the same page.
Imboden was to take 2,100 cavalry and a 6-gun battery with him. Imboden mentioned that the force would benefit from more artillery, so Lee bumped another 17 cannon from different artillery battalions into Imboden’s force. Imboden had Lee’s orders; now it was time to execute them.
Imboden originally planned to leave Gettysburg early on July 4th. What Imboden hadn’t realized was the size of the convoy he would be protecting. It took nearly 7 hours for the wagon train to assemble. When it was ready to move out, Imboden was protecting around 12,000 wounded men in a column that stretched for an incredible 17 miles. The slow-moving column took off around 4:00PM, heading west on the Chambersburg Pike. Imboden placed the 18th Virginia Cavalry at the head of the column, along with a section of McClanahan’s artillery. More troopers and artillery were inserted every 1/3 of a mile in the transport column. The train moved all through the night. Imboden avoided Chambersburg, and took a road that lead to Greencastle, which was reached by day break on July 5th. Imboden recalled that “during this one night I realized more of the horrors of war than I had in all the two preceding years.”
Around 3:30AM on July 4th, Ewell’s II Corps supplies were moving south, using the Fairfield Road. Lt. General Ewell had personally met with Major John Harmon, his chief quartermaster. Ewell told him to get the supplies across the Potomac safely, or he “wanted to see his face no more.” Iverson’s Brigade, which had been completely destroyed on July 1st, was detached to protect the columns rear. By the evening of July 4th, J.E.B Stuart and his cavalry had branched out to screen the Confederate retreat.
Meade was anxious to intercept Lee’s retreating forces. He quickly dispatched his cavalry to meet the opportunity. Major General Alfred Pleasonton was the first to start out. Brigadier General Buford and his cavalry left Westminster, Maryland on July 4th, and moved towards the town of Williamsport to cut off the Confederate withdrawal. Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry division rode towards Emmitsburg, Maryland, and briefly encountered Ewell’s supply train. Kilpatrick, who had ordered an ill-advised cavalry assault shortly after the Confederate infantry attack failed on the 3rd, was looking for a way to redeem himself. He claimed that “Ewell’s large train was completely destroyed”, which was entirely not true. The most significant raid that day was by Colonel Pennock Huey, who reported the capture of 1,500 Confederates and 150 of their wagons.
While the bulk of both armies stared at each other throughout July 4th, a heavy rain began to fall. As one soldier stated, it seemed as if the heavens were attempting to “rinse the blood from the ground.” A truce was in place by noon, and both sides began collecting the wounded and burying the dead. By nightfall, neither army had made an offensive maneuver, and Lee felt confident that if he left Meade alone, that Meade would leave him alone.
After dark on July 4th, Lee began putting his infantry on the Fairfield Road. Lt. General A.P. Hill’s III Corps was in the lead. When Hill and his men reached the town of Fairfield, Longstreet’s I Corps began to withdrawal. Longstreet’s men faced awful road conditions along the way. Due to the heavy rains, Ewell’s supply column and Hill’s Corps had turned the roads into mud pits. On top of that, Longstreet’s men had the responsibility of guarding approximately 4,000 Union prisoners along the way. As the majority of the Army of Northern Virginia faded away from Gettysburg, the infantry in Ewell’s II Corps remained behind, hoping the Federals would stay put.
The Battle of Gettysburg was over. Lee’s invasion of the north had failed.
Monday, July 4, 2011
Sunday, July 3, 2011
“The Only Christian Minded Being on Either Side” - Steuart's Brigade at Culp's Hill on July 3, 1863
July 3 - 12:30 AM
The battlefield had been quiet for an hour or more. Brigadier General George Steuart and his men had been fighting since the late afternoon hours of July 2nd, and now they lay in the captured breastworks of the Union XII Corps. The fight had been a success, but not without cost. The topography presented on Culp’s Hill made for an extremely physical assault, and Union gunfire did not help their cause in scaling the steep inclines. Steuart’s Brigade, which included the 1st Maryland Battalion, 1st North Carolina, 3rd North Carolina, 10th Virginia, 23rd Virginia, and the 37th Virginia, now occupied a good portion of the Union breastworks. Around 11PM, the firing died out on Culp’s Hill. Morale was high. The Confederates had succeeded for the most part, and occupied Union lines. Sgt. Thomas Betterton of the 37th Virginia had even captured the colors belonging to the 157th New York. Steuart’s Brigade had little time to savor the victory.
Although most of the men did not know this at the time, the Baltimore Pike lay only a couple hundred yards away. The Baltimore Pike was the main artery for the Army of The Potomac at Gettysburg, and in case of defeat, would be their most viable escape route. Now, just after midnight and into the third day of combat, the Baltimore Pike was crawling with activity. The sounds of artillery being wheeled along the road and into the position, and the trample of thousands of feet could be heard by the Confederate troops on Culp’s Hill. In fact, the XII Corps units that were rushed off of Culp’s Hill during the afternoon and evening of July 2nd were now returning to their former positions. What the Federals didn’t know was that the Confederates were now within their former position.
The first regiment to wander into Steuart’s Brigade was the 111th Pennsylvania. Steuart’s men fired a volley, and the 111th Pennsylvania did not pursue the issue any further. Another regiment, the 2nd Massachusetts, literally walked into the 23rd Virginia. After a brief struggle and skirmish, the 2nd Massachusetts also decided that the effort spent was not worth it. The Confederate soldiers knew the Union soldiers would not sit still as morning approached, and the sounds of thousands of troops and artillery gave them a deep sense of what to expect in a few hours. As a soldier in the 1st Maryland later wrote, “The worst was to come.”
Around 3:30AM, Culp’s Hill erupted with cannon and musket fire. The Confederate troops were initially spared, as they could easily hunker down in the captured breastworks. The 1st Maryland and 3rd North Carolina took turns occupying the breastworks on the right, and many soldiers took cover behind huge boulders and thick trees. At this point, the 3rd North Carolina had fired nearly all of its ammunition. Some men had only one or two cartridges left. The men frantically requisitioned more ammunition off of the dead and dying, both Union and Confederate. By 4AM, the noise coming from Culp’s Hill was deafening. One Marylander wrote, “The whole hillside seemed enveloped in a blaze. Minnie balls pattered upon the breastworks…like hail upon a housetop. Solid shot went crashing through the woods, adding the danger from falling limbs of trees to that from erratic fragments of exploding shells. The whole hill was covered with smoke and smell of powder. No enemy could be seen.”
Entire trees were swept away from the amount of gunfire between the two lines. Many men were given the impression that a fight this fierce had yet to be seen during the war. Rifles soon became clogged from black powder residue, and soldiers were scrambling for new weapons that wouldn’t foul after two or three shots. Another problem was ammunition, as there were only so many dead or wounded bodies to take from. Lt. Randolph McKim of the 1st Maryland personally took a few men with him towards the rear in search of ammunition. In the dark, they fumbled their way over Rock Creek, found the ammunition, and returned with it carrying the cartridges in a blanket which had been slung over fence rails.
The intense firing eventually died down along the lines. Around 10AM on July 3rd, Steuart received orders to attack the Federal positions. After seeing the land between his brigade and the enemy, Steuart realized that any attack on Union positions was doomed. He complained to his division commander, General Johnson, but knew that his brigade must be committed to the assault. Major Goldsborough spoke his opinion, “Sir, I consider it murder; I take my men in under protest.”
Soon, the 900 men of Steuart’s Brigade were on the move. The brigade approached Pardee’s Field, a small clearing in the otherwise heavily wooded saddle of Culp’s Hill. As the men rushed into the clearing, a wall of gunfire greeted them. Men fell by the score. Those left standing could not resist the urge to stop and fire at their tormentors. As the situation seemed destined for failure, many of the men streamed towards the rear.
The 1st Maryland and the remaining portion of the 3rd North Carolina advanced into an explosive round of cannon fire. The Marylanders could see Virginians lying prone in the field to their left, as their officers swore and pleaded for their men to continue the assault. Major Goldsborough later wrote, “Never shall I forget the expressions of contempt on the faces of the men on the left companies of the Second (First) Maryland as they cast a side glance upon their comrades who had proved recreant in this supreme moment.”
The brigade started to break down. The losses mounted, and the men looked around for someone to lead them, or at least relieve them from the hell they were experiencing. Unfortunately, many of the officers had fallen early in the fight, including the 1st Maryland’s Major Goldsborough. Oliver Taylor of the 37th Virginia later wrote that the “Marylanders lay in heaps.” Sergeant George Pile, also of the 37th Virginia, recalled that the1st Maryland had been destroyed, and that he and one other member of his company escaped the battle unharmed.
Inevitably, the brigade fell apart and retired to the base of Culp’s Hill. The images of horror were abundant. Union soldiers watched a private struggling in the middle of Pardee’s Field after the firing had subsided. The Confederate had been shot in the stomach, and was pleading for someone to shoot him in the head and put him out of the incredible pain he was experiencing. No one could bring themselves to level their muskets at the wounded man. Then, almost methodically, the Confederate soldier reached for his weapon and began to load it. A cartridge was torn, the powder poured, and the lead Minnie ball inserted into the barrel. The soldier rammed the cartridge home; the clanging of his ramrod the only noise the Union soldiers could hear. Silently, the soldier cocked the trigger, primed his piece, then lowered the weapon. He slid the butt of the rifle towards his feet. With wide eyes the Union men watched, still unsure of the intentions of this desperate fellow. Slowly, the soldier inserted the barrel of his weapon into his mouth. With hundreds of eyes upon him, the soldier pushed his ramrod against the trigger, and which discharged the rifle brought an end to his suffering.
There were also scenes of companionship, loyalty, and heart break. A dog soon appeared through the smoke, heading towards the Union lines. He appeared to be looking for his master, his head low to the ground, moving from body to body. It wasn’t long before the Union troops noticed that the dog had been riddled with bullets. The dog continued on, searching for the human he adored. He took a few more steps, then fell over. Some Union soldiers, already overwhelmed by the events from earlier, openly wept over the courage and loyalty of this poor creature. General Kane, who commanded a brigade in Geary’s Division of the XII Corps, ordered him to be buried as “the only Christian minded being on either side.”
Steuart from distraught when he saw the results of the attack. Tears streamed from his eyes as he exclaimed “My poor boys! My poor boys!” Only 12 men returned from the 3rd North Carolina. The 1st Maryland Battalion lost nearly 50% of its men. Many of the men in the 1st Maryland reported holes in their clothing where bullets had ripped the fabric without harming the individual. Lt. McKim personally counted four tears in his coat, although none of them hit him.
Colonel John Futch, who lost a brother in the assault, wrote home, “I believe he is happy and no doubt better than any of us.” No one from Steuart’s Brigade would argue his closing comment; “We are living the worst life men ever have.”
The battlefield had been quiet for an hour or more. Brigadier General George Steuart and his men had been fighting since the late afternoon hours of July 2nd, and now they lay in the captured breastworks of the Union XII Corps. The fight had been a success, but not without cost. The topography presented on Culp’s Hill made for an extremely physical assault, and Union gunfire did not help their cause in scaling the steep inclines. Steuart’s Brigade, which included the 1st Maryland Battalion, 1st North Carolina, 3rd North Carolina, 10th Virginia, 23rd Virginia, and the 37th Virginia, now occupied a good portion of the Union breastworks. Around 11PM, the firing died out on Culp’s Hill. Morale was high. The Confederates had succeeded for the most part, and occupied Union lines. Sgt. Thomas Betterton of the 37th Virginia had even captured the colors belonging to the 157th New York. Steuart’s Brigade had little time to savor the victory.
Although most of the men did not know this at the time, the Baltimore Pike lay only a couple hundred yards away. The Baltimore Pike was the main artery for the Army of The Potomac at Gettysburg, and in case of defeat, would be their most viable escape route. Now, just after midnight and into the third day of combat, the Baltimore Pike was crawling with activity. The sounds of artillery being wheeled along the road and into the position, and the trample of thousands of feet could be heard by the Confederate troops on Culp’s Hill. In fact, the XII Corps units that were rushed off of Culp’s Hill during the afternoon and evening of July 2nd were now returning to their former positions. What the Federals didn’t know was that the Confederates were now within their former position.
The first regiment to wander into Steuart’s Brigade was the 111th Pennsylvania. Steuart’s men fired a volley, and the 111th Pennsylvania did not pursue the issue any further. Another regiment, the 2nd Massachusetts, literally walked into the 23rd Virginia. After a brief struggle and skirmish, the 2nd Massachusetts also decided that the effort spent was not worth it. The Confederate soldiers knew the Union soldiers would not sit still as morning approached, and the sounds of thousands of troops and artillery gave them a deep sense of what to expect in a few hours. As a soldier in the 1st Maryland later wrote, “The worst was to come.”
Around 3:30AM, Culp’s Hill erupted with cannon and musket fire. The Confederate troops were initially spared, as they could easily hunker down in the captured breastworks. The 1st Maryland and 3rd North Carolina took turns occupying the breastworks on the right, and many soldiers took cover behind huge boulders and thick trees. At this point, the 3rd North Carolina had fired nearly all of its ammunition. Some men had only one or two cartridges left. The men frantically requisitioned more ammunition off of the dead and dying, both Union and Confederate. By 4AM, the noise coming from Culp’s Hill was deafening. One Marylander wrote, “The whole hillside seemed enveloped in a blaze. Minnie balls pattered upon the breastworks…like hail upon a housetop. Solid shot went crashing through the woods, adding the danger from falling limbs of trees to that from erratic fragments of exploding shells. The whole hill was covered with smoke and smell of powder. No enemy could be seen.”
Entire trees were swept away from the amount of gunfire between the two lines. Many men were given the impression that a fight this fierce had yet to be seen during the war. Rifles soon became clogged from black powder residue, and soldiers were scrambling for new weapons that wouldn’t foul after two or three shots. Another problem was ammunition, as there were only so many dead or wounded bodies to take from. Lt. Randolph McKim of the 1st Maryland personally took a few men with him towards the rear in search of ammunition. In the dark, they fumbled their way over Rock Creek, found the ammunition, and returned with it carrying the cartridges in a blanket which had been slung over fence rails.
The intense firing eventually died down along the lines. Around 10AM on July 3rd, Steuart received orders to attack the Federal positions. After seeing the land between his brigade and the enemy, Steuart realized that any attack on Union positions was doomed. He complained to his division commander, General Johnson, but knew that his brigade must be committed to the assault. Major Goldsborough spoke his opinion, “Sir, I consider it murder; I take my men in under protest.”
Soon, the 900 men of Steuart’s Brigade were on the move. The brigade approached Pardee’s Field, a small clearing in the otherwise heavily wooded saddle of Culp’s Hill. As the men rushed into the clearing, a wall of gunfire greeted them. Men fell by the score. Those left standing could not resist the urge to stop and fire at their tormentors. As the situation seemed destined for failure, many of the men streamed towards the rear.
The 1st Maryland and the remaining portion of the 3rd North Carolina advanced into an explosive round of cannon fire. The Marylanders could see Virginians lying prone in the field to their left, as their officers swore and pleaded for their men to continue the assault. Major Goldsborough later wrote, “Never shall I forget the expressions of contempt on the faces of the men on the left companies of the Second (First) Maryland as they cast a side glance upon their comrades who had proved recreant in this supreme moment.”
The brigade started to break down. The losses mounted, and the men looked around for someone to lead them, or at least relieve them from the hell they were experiencing. Unfortunately, many of the officers had fallen early in the fight, including the 1st Maryland’s Major Goldsborough. Oliver Taylor of the 37th Virginia later wrote that the “Marylanders lay in heaps.” Sergeant George Pile, also of the 37th Virginia, recalled that the1st Maryland had been destroyed, and that he and one other member of his company escaped the battle unharmed.
Inevitably, the brigade fell apart and retired to the base of Culp’s Hill. The images of horror were abundant. Union soldiers watched a private struggling in the middle of Pardee’s Field after the firing had subsided. The Confederate had been shot in the stomach, and was pleading for someone to shoot him in the head and put him out of the incredible pain he was experiencing. No one could bring themselves to level their muskets at the wounded man. Then, almost methodically, the Confederate soldier reached for his weapon and began to load it. A cartridge was torn, the powder poured, and the lead Minnie ball inserted into the barrel. The soldier rammed the cartridge home; the clanging of his ramrod the only noise the Union soldiers could hear. Silently, the soldier cocked the trigger, primed his piece, then lowered the weapon. He slid the butt of the rifle towards his feet. With wide eyes the Union men watched, still unsure of the intentions of this desperate fellow. Slowly, the soldier inserted the barrel of his weapon into his mouth. With hundreds of eyes upon him, the soldier pushed his ramrod against the trigger, and which discharged the rifle brought an end to his suffering.
There were also scenes of companionship, loyalty, and heart break. A dog soon appeared through the smoke, heading towards the Union lines. He appeared to be looking for his master, his head low to the ground, moving from body to body. It wasn’t long before the Union troops noticed that the dog had been riddled with bullets. The dog continued on, searching for the human he adored. He took a few more steps, then fell over. Some Union soldiers, already overwhelmed by the events from earlier, openly wept over the courage and loyalty of this poor creature. General Kane, who commanded a brigade in Geary’s Division of the XII Corps, ordered him to be buried as “the only Christian minded being on either side.”
Steuart from distraught when he saw the results of the attack. Tears streamed from his eyes as he exclaimed “My poor boys! My poor boys!” Only 12 men returned from the 3rd North Carolina. The 1st Maryland Battalion lost nearly 50% of its men. Many of the men in the 1st Maryland reported holes in their clothing where bullets had ripped the fabric without harming the individual. Lt. McKim personally counted four tears in his coat, although none of them hit him.
Colonel John Futch, who lost a brother in the assault, wrote home, “I believe he is happy and no doubt better than any of us.” No one from Steuart’s Brigade would argue his closing comment; “We are living the worst life men ever have.”
Saturday, July 2, 2011
"This is My Last Battle" - Colonel Cross and His Brigade at The Wheatfield
July 2, 1863 - 9:00AM
Colonel Edward Cross commanded a brigade in Caldwell’s Division, belonging to Hancock’s II Corps. As his staff rode alongside him, Colonel Cross leaned over to his aide, Major Charles Hale, and said in an uncharacteristic low-tone, “Mr. Hale, attend to that box of mine at the first opportunity.” Major Hale quickly glanced towards his commander, nodded, then turned his attention back to the road. “Thank you, Mr. Hale.”
Cross’s Brigade was finally approaching Cemetery Hill. His brigade consisted of the 5th New Hampshire, 61st New York, 81st Pennsylvania, and 148th Pennsylvania. All in all, Cross had 853 men under his command. On their way to Cemetery Hill, Cross and his men were passing by a number of II Corps hospitals. Lt. Charles Fuller of the 61st New York joked with the surgeons; “ ‘We’ll see you again later!’ I tried to say this with a jaunty air, but down in my shoes I did not feel a bit jaunty.“ For Lt. Fuller and many of Cross’s troops, his playful exclamation turned into reality a few hours later.
As Cross’s brigade arrived on Cemetery Hill, he positioned his brigade in battle lines, but “stacked” upon each other. The first line was manned by the 61st New York, followed by the 81st Pennsylvania in the second line. The 148th Pennsylvania, because of its size, formed the next two lines, and the 5th New Hampshire held the rear. For most of the early afternoon, the men spent their time playing cards and writing to their loved ones. Others dozed off, catching up on the sleep that had been evading them over the last four weeks.
Around 1PM, the firing along the skirmish lines increased, especially around the Bliss Farm, which was located between the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge, and the Confederate lines on Seminary Ridge. Looking to their left, the men could see General Sickles III Corps marching forward towards the Emmitsburg Road. The move was so massive that Sickles’ left flank disappeared over a series of ridges. Inexplicably, Sickles had moved his Corps away from one of the highest vantage points on the battlefield; Little Round Top. Now, Hancock’s left flank was exposed. The situation was even worse for Sickles; the movement he made was unauthorized, poorly planned, and left both of his flanks open to attack. Sickles’ advance actually threw off the Confederate battle plan, but he did not know it at the time. Around 3:30PM, Confederate artillery opened on the Union left. Shortly after, musket fire erupted, and rolled northward as Confederate brigades were being launched en echelon; one brigade advancing, followed by the brigade to its left around 15-20 minutes later. A trickle of Union stragglers and wounded soon turned into a steady stream. Sickles was in trouble, and the closest support was located within Hancock’s II Corps. Cross eventually notices Hancock’s staff talking to Caldwell, his division commander. Cross knows what this means, and he orders his staff to mount up and for his men to be ready.
Caldwell’s Division has orders to move quickly to the south-west. The III Corps is getting hammered around Devils Den and the Peach Orchard, and Union troops around the Rose Farm have started to give way. Confederate troops are breeching the center of Sickles’ line, and Caldwell’s Division is to plug the gap. Colonel Cross traditionally wears a red handkerchief around his head in combat. Just before going in to combat on July 2nd, Cross removes a black handkerchief instead of the usual red. Before leaving for the front, General Hancock rode up to Colonel Cross and hinted towards promotion; “Colonel Cross, this day will bring you a star.” Cross shook his head, “No, General, this is my last battle.” Cross had a premonition of death for days before arriving at Gettysburg, and usually directed his comments towards Major Hale. Today, he was telling his Corps commander that he would not be returning.
This was Caldwell’s first time commanding a division during an engagement. Instead of sending the brigade in as a whole, he fed them into the fire in chunks, one brigade at a time. The brigade formed a battle line, from left to right; the 5th New Hampshire, 148th Pennsylvania, 81st Pennsylvania, and the 61st New York. Cross’s Brigade was in the lead, and they moved rapidly towards the fighting. Men sprinted through gullies, over rocks, through dense brush, and into a line of tree’s. Lying directly in front of them was a Wheatfield, the crops waist high and ready for harvesting. For a moment, all was silent on this portion of the Union line, except for a stray shell here and there. Cross and his men carried their momentum into the wheatfield. In fact, Cross’s advance was so fast, that a number of Confederate skirmishers had no time to react and simply threw their arms up in surrender. The 5th New Hampshire and 7 companies of the 148th Pennsylvania advanced into the woods surrounding the wheatfield. The rest of the brigade was exposed in an open field, which descended down towards another set of woods directly in front of them. Cross had deployed so fast that he did not send out skirmishers, which left his brigade exposed to a hidden enemy. Cross and his staff soon dismounted. Just inside the woods to Cross’s front lay a stone wall, and Confederate troops patiently waited for Cross and his men to attack. The air soon filled with the hissing and buzzing of bullets flying through the air. The men could hear the firing, and could see the heads of the wheat being clipped off by enemy fire, but they couldn’t locate the enemy just yet. Then the men started to fall. The 61st New York was hit the hardest. Among the wounded was Lt. Charles Fuller, who had recently exchanged pleasantries with the II Corps surgeons. He was initially shot in the left shoulder, and then again in the right thigh. He was able to utilize a tourniquet with his good arm to help reduce the loss of blood in his thigh wound, which probably saved his life. The 61st New York would eventually lose two-thirds of their men in the fight in and around the Wheatfield.
Up and down the line, the men in blue continued to fall. The effect of their fire was unknown, as they could only see the puffs of smoke erupting from the tree line. Cross knew that his men needed to move, and most certainly towards the Confederate positions and not the Union rear. He turned to Major Hale and the rest of his staff’ “Boys, instruct the commanders to be ready to charge when the order is given; or if you hear the bugles of the 5th New Hampshire on the left, move forward on the run.”
Colonel Cross drew his pistol, then wandered off towards the position of the 5th New Hampshire. As he was approaching, a bullet glanced off of his head. Stunned, the Colonel fell to the ground. Realizing that he had initially been spared, he removed the handkerchief, and bound the minor wound inflicted upon his head. Cross was approaching the 5th New Hampshire when he was struck. A bullet slammed into his abdomen near his navel, and tore through his stomach and portions of his intestines and kidneys before finally exiting near his spine. The Colonel fell, and for what must have seemed like an eternity, was left alone in woods near the 5th New Hampshire.
News of Cross’ wounding propelled Colonel Harman Boyd McKeen to commander of the brigade. Colonel McKeen was unfortunately put in a difficult position, as his brigade was being ripped apart. Also, the brigade had been fighting so hard, that most, if not all, of their ammunition was fired in 20 minutes. McKeen determined that the brigade was too exposed and too ineffective to go on; he ordered a withdrawal. Around 6:15PM, the brigade began to fall back, except for the 5th New Hampshire and 148th Pennsylvania; they remained in their positions, as the woods had protected them somewhat, and their casualties were not nearly as high as the other regiments. When Brooke’s Brigade entered the wheat field, the 5th New Hampshire and 148th Pennsylvania fought along side of them. Eventually, Sweitzer’s Brigade advanced beyond their position, and the 5th New Hampshire and 148th Pennsylvania finally left the field.
The brigade lost 330 men out of the 853 that entered the Wheatfield.
Lt. Charles Fuller of the 61st New York spent a horrendous night in the Wheatfield. The cries of the wounded seemed to amplify with every passing minute. Lt. Fuller was actually attacked during the early morning hours of July 3rd; not by Confederate soldiers, but wild hogs that had turned feral. Fuller later wrote that these hogs had been going around and tearing into the abdomens of the dead, and to his horror, the dying who were too weak to defend themselves. Fuller himself drew his sword and fended off 2 or 3 hogs that attempted to make a meal out of him. Fuller was eventually found and taken to the rear. His right leg was amputated above the knee, and he lost function of his left arm.
Colonel Cross was eventually found laying next to a tree in extreme pain. He was carried to the rear, where a surgeon told Cross that there was nothing he could do for him. Cross suffered immensely over the next few hours. Around 12:45 in the morning on July 3rd, Cross looked up to a member of his staff who was sitting beside him and said, “I think the boys will miss me.” With those words, Colonel Cross slipped away. The Colonel had realized his destiny, and he met it with all the courage in the world.
Colonel Edward Cross commanded a brigade in Caldwell’s Division, belonging to Hancock’s II Corps. As his staff rode alongside him, Colonel Cross leaned over to his aide, Major Charles Hale, and said in an uncharacteristic low-tone, “Mr. Hale, attend to that box of mine at the first opportunity.” Major Hale quickly glanced towards his commander, nodded, then turned his attention back to the road. “Thank you, Mr. Hale.”
Cross’s Brigade was finally approaching Cemetery Hill. His brigade consisted of the 5th New Hampshire, 61st New York, 81st Pennsylvania, and 148th Pennsylvania. All in all, Cross had 853 men under his command. On their way to Cemetery Hill, Cross and his men were passing by a number of II Corps hospitals. Lt. Charles Fuller of the 61st New York joked with the surgeons; “ ‘We’ll see you again later!’ I tried to say this with a jaunty air, but down in my shoes I did not feel a bit jaunty.“ For Lt. Fuller and many of Cross’s troops, his playful exclamation turned into reality a few hours later.
As Cross’s brigade arrived on Cemetery Hill, he positioned his brigade in battle lines, but “stacked” upon each other. The first line was manned by the 61st New York, followed by the 81st Pennsylvania in the second line. The 148th Pennsylvania, because of its size, formed the next two lines, and the 5th New Hampshire held the rear. For most of the early afternoon, the men spent their time playing cards and writing to their loved ones. Others dozed off, catching up on the sleep that had been evading them over the last four weeks.
Around 1PM, the firing along the skirmish lines increased, especially around the Bliss Farm, which was located between the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge, and the Confederate lines on Seminary Ridge. Looking to their left, the men could see General Sickles III Corps marching forward towards the Emmitsburg Road. The move was so massive that Sickles’ left flank disappeared over a series of ridges. Inexplicably, Sickles had moved his Corps away from one of the highest vantage points on the battlefield; Little Round Top. Now, Hancock’s left flank was exposed. The situation was even worse for Sickles; the movement he made was unauthorized, poorly planned, and left both of his flanks open to attack. Sickles’ advance actually threw off the Confederate battle plan, but he did not know it at the time. Around 3:30PM, Confederate artillery opened on the Union left. Shortly after, musket fire erupted, and rolled northward as Confederate brigades were being launched en echelon; one brigade advancing, followed by the brigade to its left around 15-20 minutes later. A trickle of Union stragglers and wounded soon turned into a steady stream. Sickles was in trouble, and the closest support was located within Hancock’s II Corps. Cross eventually notices Hancock’s staff talking to Caldwell, his division commander. Cross knows what this means, and he orders his staff to mount up and for his men to be ready.
Caldwell’s Division has orders to move quickly to the south-west. The III Corps is getting hammered around Devils Den and the Peach Orchard, and Union troops around the Rose Farm have started to give way. Confederate troops are breeching the center of Sickles’ line, and Caldwell’s Division is to plug the gap. Colonel Cross traditionally wears a red handkerchief around his head in combat. Just before going in to combat on July 2nd, Cross removes a black handkerchief instead of the usual red. Before leaving for the front, General Hancock rode up to Colonel Cross and hinted towards promotion; “Colonel Cross, this day will bring you a star.” Cross shook his head, “No, General, this is my last battle.” Cross had a premonition of death for days before arriving at Gettysburg, and usually directed his comments towards Major Hale. Today, he was telling his Corps commander that he would not be returning.
This was Caldwell’s first time commanding a division during an engagement. Instead of sending the brigade in as a whole, he fed them into the fire in chunks, one brigade at a time. The brigade formed a battle line, from left to right; the 5th New Hampshire, 148th Pennsylvania, 81st Pennsylvania, and the 61st New York. Cross’s Brigade was in the lead, and they moved rapidly towards the fighting. Men sprinted through gullies, over rocks, through dense brush, and into a line of tree’s. Lying directly in front of them was a Wheatfield, the crops waist high and ready for harvesting. For a moment, all was silent on this portion of the Union line, except for a stray shell here and there. Cross and his men carried their momentum into the wheatfield. In fact, Cross’s advance was so fast, that a number of Confederate skirmishers had no time to react and simply threw their arms up in surrender. The 5th New Hampshire and 7 companies of the 148th Pennsylvania advanced into the woods surrounding the wheatfield. The rest of the brigade was exposed in an open field, which descended down towards another set of woods directly in front of them. Cross had deployed so fast that he did not send out skirmishers, which left his brigade exposed to a hidden enemy. Cross and his staff soon dismounted. Just inside the woods to Cross’s front lay a stone wall, and Confederate troops patiently waited for Cross and his men to attack. The air soon filled with the hissing and buzzing of bullets flying through the air. The men could hear the firing, and could see the heads of the wheat being clipped off by enemy fire, but they couldn’t locate the enemy just yet. Then the men started to fall. The 61st New York was hit the hardest. Among the wounded was Lt. Charles Fuller, who had recently exchanged pleasantries with the II Corps surgeons. He was initially shot in the left shoulder, and then again in the right thigh. He was able to utilize a tourniquet with his good arm to help reduce the loss of blood in his thigh wound, which probably saved his life. The 61st New York would eventually lose two-thirds of their men in the fight in and around the Wheatfield.
Up and down the line, the men in blue continued to fall. The effect of their fire was unknown, as they could only see the puffs of smoke erupting from the tree line. Cross knew that his men needed to move, and most certainly towards the Confederate positions and not the Union rear. He turned to Major Hale and the rest of his staff’ “Boys, instruct the commanders to be ready to charge when the order is given; or if you hear the bugles of the 5th New Hampshire on the left, move forward on the run.”
Colonel Cross drew his pistol, then wandered off towards the position of the 5th New Hampshire. As he was approaching, a bullet glanced off of his head. Stunned, the Colonel fell to the ground. Realizing that he had initially been spared, he removed the handkerchief, and bound the minor wound inflicted upon his head. Cross was approaching the 5th New Hampshire when he was struck. A bullet slammed into his abdomen near his navel, and tore through his stomach and portions of his intestines and kidneys before finally exiting near his spine. The Colonel fell, and for what must have seemed like an eternity, was left alone in woods near the 5th New Hampshire.
News of Cross’ wounding propelled Colonel Harman Boyd McKeen to commander of the brigade. Colonel McKeen was unfortunately put in a difficult position, as his brigade was being ripped apart. Also, the brigade had been fighting so hard, that most, if not all, of their ammunition was fired in 20 minutes. McKeen determined that the brigade was too exposed and too ineffective to go on; he ordered a withdrawal. Around 6:15PM, the brigade began to fall back, except for the 5th New Hampshire and 148th Pennsylvania; they remained in their positions, as the woods had protected them somewhat, and their casualties were not nearly as high as the other regiments. When Brooke’s Brigade entered the wheat field, the 5th New Hampshire and 148th Pennsylvania fought along side of them. Eventually, Sweitzer’s Brigade advanced beyond their position, and the 5th New Hampshire and 148th Pennsylvania finally left the field.
The brigade lost 330 men out of the 853 that entered the Wheatfield.
Lt. Charles Fuller of the 61st New York spent a horrendous night in the Wheatfield. The cries of the wounded seemed to amplify with every passing minute. Lt. Fuller was actually attacked during the early morning hours of July 3rd; not by Confederate soldiers, but wild hogs that had turned feral. Fuller later wrote that these hogs had been going around and tearing into the abdomens of the dead, and to his horror, the dying who were too weak to defend themselves. Fuller himself drew his sword and fended off 2 or 3 hogs that attempted to make a meal out of him. Fuller was eventually found and taken to the rear. His right leg was amputated above the knee, and he lost function of his left arm.
Colonel Cross was eventually found laying next to a tree in extreme pain. He was carried to the rear, where a surgeon told Cross that there was nothing he could do for him. Cross suffered immensely over the next few hours. Around 12:45 in the morning on July 3rd, Cross looked up to a member of his staff who was sitting beside him and said, “I think the boys will miss me.” With those words, Colonel Cross slipped away. The Colonel had realized his destiny, and he met it with all the courage in the world.
Friday, July 1, 2011
Fame & Devastation: The Pettigrew - Iron Brigade Engagement
July 1, 1863 - 8:00AM
Solomon Meredith’s Iron Brigade (Reynolds’ I Corps) is forming on the roads just south of Gettysburg. The Iron Brigade has a reputation that follows them into battle; a reputation of being the best in the Army of The Potomac. The brigade is comprised of four regiments from the mid-west; the 19th Indiana, 24th Michigan, 2nd Wisconsin, 6th Wisconsin, and the 7th Wisconsin. On the morning of July 1st, Meredith’s brigade consisted of 1,829 soldiers and officers. The troops were on their way to support and relieve Buford and his battle weary troopers which were holding off Confederate attacks on the ridges to the west of Gettysburg.
When the brigade was 4 miles away from Gettysburg, the soldiers heard the deep booming of artillery. As the men marched on, the crackle of muskets filtered into the atmosphere, and the men realized that a significant fight was waiting for them. Around 10AM, the brigade reached the Codori House along the Emmitsburg Road. The brigade made a sharp left, and began running through the fields in a north-westerly direction, which put them on a direct route to McPherson’s Ridge. The officers shouted up and down the line, “Double quick, boys! Double quick!” During this nearly mile-long sprint, officers began to realize that their troops were rushing into battle with empty muskets. The only regiment that was loaded and ready were the boys in the 19th Indiana, who served on picket duty the night before. Colonel Morrow, commander of the 24th Michigan, temporarily halted his men so that they could load their weapons. The men stopped, pulled cartridges, then heard an order from another officer telling them otherwise. An officer from General Wadsworth’s staff was riding by and immediately revoked the order, and ordered Morrow to rush his men to Herbst Woods with all possible speed. The only option now was to have the men load while sprinting towards their objective.
The 2nd Wisconsin reached the crest of McPherson’s Ridge first. The 7th and 14th Tennessee fired into the Wisconsin troops as they poured over the ridge. Their Corps commander, General Reynolds, turned to the men of the 2nd Wisconsin and urged them on. “Forward men, forward, for God’s sake and drive those fellows out of the woods!” Just then, a bullet slammed into the back of Reynolds’ head. He was dead before he hit the ground.
The rest of the Iron Brigade formed behind the 2nd Wisconsin. As they arrived, they found themselves enveloped in a dense smoke. Colonel Robinson, commander of the 7th Wisconsin, soon heard bullets flying over his head. He was hesitant to open fire. He knew the 2nd Wisconsin was somewhere in front of the rest of the brigade, but he could not identify the force as friend or foe. A quick glance towards his left revealed a Confederate battle flag, only 20 yards in front of his own lines. Robinson immediately launched an assault, and the Union infantry lunged into the thick smoke, disappearing among the enemy and deafening noise.
Further up the line, the 19th Indiana and the 24th Michigan overlapped the Confederate right flank of Archer’s line. The 24th Michigan advanced beyond the Confederate flank, and soon enveloped Archer’s right flank and rear. Within minutes, the Confederates gave way. Soldiers who thought they could make it to the rear attempted to run, while others simply threw their weapons down and made their way behind Union lines. Private Patrick Maloney made his way to the rear with a prize - he personally snagged General Archer. Unfortunately, Private Maloney would be killed later that day.
After pursuing the remnants of Archer’s brigade across Willoughby Run, the Iron Brigade fell back to its former positions in Herbst Woods. Around 11:30AM, the brigade was realigned, forming an obtuse angle, with the “dent” in the center of the line. The line officers immediately protested the formation, but were denied a request to reposition, as the ground must be held “whatever the cost may be.”
The 6th Wisconsin was originally ordered to fall in on the left flank of the 24th Michigan. As the 6th approached their portion of the line, another staff officer ordered the regiment to be a part of the division’s reserve. Colonel Rufus Dawes, the 6th’s commander, soon found his unit in the middle of a field, exhausted and uneasy about what role they were actually going to play. After a short rest, the men of the 6th watched helplessly as Cutler’s brigade, fighting directly in front of them, began to break and run to the rear. The 6th was ordered to advance. Almost immediately, Dawes was dumped to the ground after his horse was shot multiple times. He led his regiment by foot for the rest of the attack. When the regiment reached the fence along the Chambersburg Pike, the men went prone, and began firing at Confederates only 50 yards away. Mysteriously, Confederate troops were disappearing - not hit or vaporized, just the appearance of melting into the ground. Dawes ordered his men forward, as the enemy had simply disappeared. Flushed with victory, the men of Wisconsin climbed over the fence, and charged through the open fields. Then, from a depression in the ground, hundreds of Confederate muskets rose from the earth and blazed away at Dawes and his regiment. The Confederates had jumped into an unfinished railroad cut, and were using it as a trench. The 6th was being ripped apart with every step they took, but there was no turning back now. The men pushed on, and eventually found themselves on the lip of the railroad cut, staring into a pit of struggling humanity. “Throw down your muskets! Down with your muskets!”, the Union soldiers shouted. Over 225 men and 7 officers of the 2nd Mississippi surrendered to Dawes and his men. The railroad cut was secure.
While Dawes was slugging it out with Confederate troops in the railroad cut, the rest of the Iron Brigade focused their attention towards Willoughby Run. A massive Confederate brigade was approaching.
Pettigrew’s Brigade was an all North Carolina brigade. It had 4 regiments - the 11th North Carolina, 26th North Carolina, 47th North Carolina, and 52nd North Carolina, totaling 2,581 effectives. It was the largest brigade in the Army of Northern Virginia, mostly because the brigade had never seen combat. Of the 4 regiments, only the 26th had seen actual combat, and that had been a year before during the Peninsula Campaign in the summer of 1862. Pettigrew and his brigade were now fanning out to dislodge the Union troops on McPherson’s Ridge. Pettigrew’s men didn’t know it at the time, but they were about to clash with the toughest brigade in Meade’s army. To dislodge the Iron Brigade as your first combat experience was a tall order to fill, and seems nearly impossible to this day. But, the North Carolinians had numbers on their side, and a tactical blunder from the Union command. Biddle had orders to align his brigade on the left flank of the Iron Brigade. That would have extended the Union position another couple hundred yards to the south and west. Instead, Biddle formed his brigade to the left and rear of the Iron Brigade - 300 yards from the left flank of the Iron Brigade, which was held by the 19th Indiana. This presented a huge gap between the 2 brigades that could be exploited by determined Confederate troops. To make matters worse, Pettigrew’s Brigade was so huge that it even overlapped Biddle’s Brigade.
Around 2:00PM, the order to advance was given. The 26th North Carolina and 11th North Carolina ran into trouble first. On the other side of Willoughby Run stood the men of the 24th Michigan and 19th Indiana. The first shots from the Union line was high, and was relatively harmless. Colonel Morrow of the 24th Michigan wrote that the Confederates “advanced in 2 lines of battle…they came on with rapid strides, yelling like demons.” The 26th North Carolina started to shift to the right, a result of enfilade cannon fire striking it’s left flank. The terrain became increasingly difficult to maneuver in. Dense thickets, steep inclines, and rocks hidden in foliage disrupted the battle lines constantly. The 26th North Carolina splashed through Willoughby Run, followed by the 11th North Carolina. The Iron Brigade was not firing high anymore. Men began falling, and soldiers remembered the bullets as being “thick as hail stones in a storm.” A colonel riding behind the 26th North Carolina was cheering the men on when a bullet lifted the hat from his head. Without a pause, the colonel reached back and plucked the hat out of the air, returning it to his balding head. The Iron Brigade, clearly the culprits, gave out a long cheer when the rebel officer returned the hat to its former location.
The 26th North Carolina was moving rapidly. It closed in on the 24th Michigan, and the two lines stood only 20 paces apart at times, delivering volley’s at point-blank range. The North Carolinians break the first line of the 24th Michigan, but run into its second line only 20-30 yards to the rear. The 11th North Carolina was slugging it out with the 19th Indiana, which was stubbornly holding its ground. Eventually, the 11th North Carolina found the exposed flank of the 19th Indiana, and began to roll the Union line up. The 26th North Carolina and 24th Michigan were locked in a devastating struggle. Neither wanted to withdrawal and admit defeat. Casualties mounted. So far, 10 flag bearers had been killed or wounded in the 26th North Carolina. The same was true for the 24th Michigan. At one point, an officer in the 24th ordered the flag to be wrapped up and placed into its shuck to avoid further casualties. The 26th North Carolina wanted to keep its flag moving. Soon, an officer from Pettigrew’s staff grabbed the flag and began advancing. He took a few steps, then was riddled by 8 bullets. A Captain seized the flag as it was falling to the ground - he was shot in the face after holding it for a few seconds. The 26th North Carolina’s commander, Colonel Henry Burgwyn, raised the flag next. “Dress on the colors! Dress on the colors!” A private ran up to the Colonel, asking for the honor of carrying the flag. As Burgwyn transferred the flag to the private, a hail of bullets slammed into them. Burgwyn was severely wound, and the private’s face had been shot away. Burgwyn would eventually die later that day from his wounds. The 14th flag bearer for the regiment was Lt. Colonel John Lane. He, too, was severely wounded in the throat. The next flag bearer was extremely lucky; as soon as he grabbed the flag, the Iron Brigade broke for the rear. It took 15 men to advance a flag just over 50 yards. The fighting became so intense that men could not handle their weapons while reloading. The barrels were so hot that men couldn’t even touch them. To ram a cartridge home, soldiers were pounding their ramrods against rocks and trees.
Both brigades were wrecked. Pettigrew’s discontinued their pursuit of the Iron Brigade as fresh units arrived. The Iron Brigade made one last stand just outside of town, inflicting more damage on the southern troops. On July 1st, the Iron Brigade had fought 3 Confederate brigades in the span of 5 hours. The remnants of the Iron Brigade soon found themselves clogged in town, along with a good portion of the XI Corps, who were fleeing the fields north of town. Eventually, the survivors reached Cemetery Hill. The Iron Brigade, a shell of its former self, was soon transferred to Culp’s Hill, where it remained for the rest of the battle.
Of the 1,829 men that went into combat that day for the Iron Brigade, 1,153 of them were killed, wounded, or missing - a sobering 63% casualty rate. For the 24th Michigan, only 26 men and 1 officer assembled under its banner. Stragglers filtering in throughout the evening raised that number to 99 men and 3 officers.
For Pettigrew, of the 2,581 that went into combat that day, nearly 1,100 of them were killed, wounded, or captured. The 26th Carolina went into combat with 900 men and officers. During their assault, 588 of them were killed, wounded, or captured. The 26th sat out July 2nd, but was involved in Pickett’s Charge on July 3rd. By the evening of July 3rd, only 67 privates and 3 officers remained from the original 900 that went into combat 2 days prior. The regiment took 83% casualties in 2 days of combat, and would never be the same.
Solomon Meredith’s Iron Brigade (Reynolds’ I Corps) is forming on the roads just south of Gettysburg. The Iron Brigade has a reputation that follows them into battle; a reputation of being the best in the Army of The Potomac. The brigade is comprised of four regiments from the mid-west; the 19th Indiana, 24th Michigan, 2nd Wisconsin, 6th Wisconsin, and the 7th Wisconsin. On the morning of July 1st, Meredith’s brigade consisted of 1,829 soldiers and officers. The troops were on their way to support and relieve Buford and his battle weary troopers which were holding off Confederate attacks on the ridges to the west of Gettysburg.
When the brigade was 4 miles away from Gettysburg, the soldiers heard the deep booming of artillery. As the men marched on, the crackle of muskets filtered into the atmosphere, and the men realized that a significant fight was waiting for them. Around 10AM, the brigade reached the Codori House along the Emmitsburg Road. The brigade made a sharp left, and began running through the fields in a north-westerly direction, which put them on a direct route to McPherson’s Ridge. The officers shouted up and down the line, “Double quick, boys! Double quick!” During this nearly mile-long sprint, officers began to realize that their troops were rushing into battle with empty muskets. The only regiment that was loaded and ready were the boys in the 19th Indiana, who served on picket duty the night before. Colonel Morrow, commander of the 24th Michigan, temporarily halted his men so that they could load their weapons. The men stopped, pulled cartridges, then heard an order from another officer telling them otherwise. An officer from General Wadsworth’s staff was riding by and immediately revoked the order, and ordered Morrow to rush his men to Herbst Woods with all possible speed. The only option now was to have the men load while sprinting towards their objective.
The 2nd Wisconsin reached the crest of McPherson’s Ridge first. The 7th and 14th Tennessee fired into the Wisconsin troops as they poured over the ridge. Their Corps commander, General Reynolds, turned to the men of the 2nd Wisconsin and urged them on. “Forward men, forward, for God’s sake and drive those fellows out of the woods!” Just then, a bullet slammed into the back of Reynolds’ head. He was dead before he hit the ground.
The rest of the Iron Brigade formed behind the 2nd Wisconsin. As they arrived, they found themselves enveloped in a dense smoke. Colonel Robinson, commander of the 7th Wisconsin, soon heard bullets flying over his head. He was hesitant to open fire. He knew the 2nd Wisconsin was somewhere in front of the rest of the brigade, but he could not identify the force as friend or foe. A quick glance towards his left revealed a Confederate battle flag, only 20 yards in front of his own lines. Robinson immediately launched an assault, and the Union infantry lunged into the thick smoke, disappearing among the enemy and deafening noise.
Further up the line, the 19th Indiana and the 24th Michigan overlapped the Confederate right flank of Archer’s line. The 24th Michigan advanced beyond the Confederate flank, and soon enveloped Archer’s right flank and rear. Within minutes, the Confederates gave way. Soldiers who thought they could make it to the rear attempted to run, while others simply threw their weapons down and made their way behind Union lines. Private Patrick Maloney made his way to the rear with a prize - he personally snagged General Archer. Unfortunately, Private Maloney would be killed later that day.
After pursuing the remnants of Archer’s brigade across Willoughby Run, the Iron Brigade fell back to its former positions in Herbst Woods. Around 11:30AM, the brigade was realigned, forming an obtuse angle, with the “dent” in the center of the line. The line officers immediately protested the formation, but were denied a request to reposition, as the ground must be held “whatever the cost may be.”
The 6th Wisconsin was originally ordered to fall in on the left flank of the 24th Michigan. As the 6th approached their portion of the line, another staff officer ordered the regiment to be a part of the division’s reserve. Colonel Rufus Dawes, the 6th’s commander, soon found his unit in the middle of a field, exhausted and uneasy about what role they were actually going to play. After a short rest, the men of the 6th watched helplessly as Cutler’s brigade, fighting directly in front of them, began to break and run to the rear. The 6th was ordered to advance. Almost immediately, Dawes was dumped to the ground after his horse was shot multiple times. He led his regiment by foot for the rest of the attack. When the regiment reached the fence along the Chambersburg Pike, the men went prone, and began firing at Confederates only 50 yards away. Mysteriously, Confederate troops were disappearing - not hit or vaporized, just the appearance of melting into the ground. Dawes ordered his men forward, as the enemy had simply disappeared. Flushed with victory, the men of Wisconsin climbed over the fence, and charged through the open fields. Then, from a depression in the ground, hundreds of Confederate muskets rose from the earth and blazed away at Dawes and his regiment. The Confederates had jumped into an unfinished railroad cut, and were using it as a trench. The 6th was being ripped apart with every step they took, but there was no turning back now. The men pushed on, and eventually found themselves on the lip of the railroad cut, staring into a pit of struggling humanity. “Throw down your muskets! Down with your muskets!”, the Union soldiers shouted. Over 225 men and 7 officers of the 2nd Mississippi surrendered to Dawes and his men. The railroad cut was secure.
While Dawes was slugging it out with Confederate troops in the railroad cut, the rest of the Iron Brigade focused their attention towards Willoughby Run. A massive Confederate brigade was approaching.
Pettigrew’s Brigade was an all North Carolina brigade. It had 4 regiments - the 11th North Carolina, 26th North Carolina, 47th North Carolina, and 52nd North Carolina, totaling 2,581 effectives. It was the largest brigade in the Army of Northern Virginia, mostly because the brigade had never seen combat. Of the 4 regiments, only the 26th had seen actual combat, and that had been a year before during the Peninsula Campaign in the summer of 1862. Pettigrew and his brigade were now fanning out to dislodge the Union troops on McPherson’s Ridge. Pettigrew’s men didn’t know it at the time, but they were about to clash with the toughest brigade in Meade’s army. To dislodge the Iron Brigade as your first combat experience was a tall order to fill, and seems nearly impossible to this day. But, the North Carolinians had numbers on their side, and a tactical blunder from the Union command. Biddle had orders to align his brigade on the left flank of the Iron Brigade. That would have extended the Union position another couple hundred yards to the south and west. Instead, Biddle formed his brigade to the left and rear of the Iron Brigade - 300 yards from the left flank of the Iron Brigade, which was held by the 19th Indiana. This presented a huge gap between the 2 brigades that could be exploited by determined Confederate troops. To make matters worse, Pettigrew’s Brigade was so huge that it even overlapped Biddle’s Brigade.
Around 2:00PM, the order to advance was given. The 26th North Carolina and 11th North Carolina ran into trouble first. On the other side of Willoughby Run stood the men of the 24th Michigan and 19th Indiana. The first shots from the Union line was high, and was relatively harmless. Colonel Morrow of the 24th Michigan wrote that the Confederates “advanced in 2 lines of battle…they came on with rapid strides, yelling like demons.” The 26th North Carolina started to shift to the right, a result of enfilade cannon fire striking it’s left flank. The terrain became increasingly difficult to maneuver in. Dense thickets, steep inclines, and rocks hidden in foliage disrupted the battle lines constantly. The 26th North Carolina splashed through Willoughby Run, followed by the 11th North Carolina. The Iron Brigade was not firing high anymore. Men began falling, and soldiers remembered the bullets as being “thick as hail stones in a storm.” A colonel riding behind the 26th North Carolina was cheering the men on when a bullet lifted the hat from his head. Without a pause, the colonel reached back and plucked the hat out of the air, returning it to his balding head. The Iron Brigade, clearly the culprits, gave out a long cheer when the rebel officer returned the hat to its former location.
The 26th North Carolina was moving rapidly. It closed in on the 24th Michigan, and the two lines stood only 20 paces apart at times, delivering volley’s at point-blank range. The North Carolinians break the first line of the 24th Michigan, but run into its second line only 20-30 yards to the rear. The 11th North Carolina was slugging it out with the 19th Indiana, which was stubbornly holding its ground. Eventually, the 11th North Carolina found the exposed flank of the 19th Indiana, and began to roll the Union line up. The 26th North Carolina and 24th Michigan were locked in a devastating struggle. Neither wanted to withdrawal and admit defeat. Casualties mounted. So far, 10 flag bearers had been killed or wounded in the 26th North Carolina. The same was true for the 24th Michigan. At one point, an officer in the 24th ordered the flag to be wrapped up and placed into its shuck to avoid further casualties. The 26th North Carolina wanted to keep its flag moving. Soon, an officer from Pettigrew’s staff grabbed the flag and began advancing. He took a few steps, then was riddled by 8 bullets. A Captain seized the flag as it was falling to the ground - he was shot in the face after holding it for a few seconds. The 26th North Carolina’s commander, Colonel Henry Burgwyn, raised the flag next. “Dress on the colors! Dress on the colors!” A private ran up to the Colonel, asking for the honor of carrying the flag. As Burgwyn transferred the flag to the private, a hail of bullets slammed into them. Burgwyn was severely wound, and the private’s face had been shot away. Burgwyn would eventually die later that day from his wounds. The 14th flag bearer for the regiment was Lt. Colonel John Lane. He, too, was severely wounded in the throat. The next flag bearer was extremely lucky; as soon as he grabbed the flag, the Iron Brigade broke for the rear. It took 15 men to advance a flag just over 50 yards. The fighting became so intense that men could not handle their weapons while reloading. The barrels were so hot that men couldn’t even touch them. To ram a cartridge home, soldiers were pounding their ramrods against rocks and trees.
Both brigades were wrecked. Pettigrew’s discontinued their pursuit of the Iron Brigade as fresh units arrived. The Iron Brigade made one last stand just outside of town, inflicting more damage on the southern troops. On July 1st, the Iron Brigade had fought 3 Confederate brigades in the span of 5 hours. The remnants of the Iron Brigade soon found themselves clogged in town, along with a good portion of the XI Corps, who were fleeing the fields north of town. Eventually, the survivors reached Cemetery Hill. The Iron Brigade, a shell of its former self, was soon transferred to Culp’s Hill, where it remained for the rest of the battle.
Of the 1,829 men that went into combat that day for the Iron Brigade, 1,153 of them were killed, wounded, or missing - a sobering 63% casualty rate. For the 24th Michigan, only 26 men and 1 officer assembled under its banner. Stragglers filtering in throughout the evening raised that number to 99 men and 3 officers.
For Pettigrew, of the 2,581 that went into combat that day, nearly 1,100 of them were killed, wounded, or captured. The 26th Carolina went into combat with 900 men and officers. During their assault, 588 of them were killed, wounded, or captured. The 26th sat out July 2nd, but was involved in Pickett’s Charge on July 3rd. By the evening of July 3rd, only 67 privates and 3 officers remained from the original 900 that went into combat 2 days prior. The regiment took 83% casualties in 2 days of combat, and would never be the same.
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